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Abstract
This Comment addresses how the US protection of personal data will fare when judged against
the adequacy standard of the Directive. Part I explains what data protection is and traces the de-
velopment of data protection law in Europe and the United States. It then analyzes the current
approaches to data protection in both the Community and the United States. Part II discusses dif-
ferent approaches to assessing adequacy. It proposes that the Article 29 Working Party presents
the only clear explanation of how to assess when a third country ensures adequate protection of
personal data. Part II then describes the Working Party’s approach to assessing what constitutes
adequate protection. Part III argues that under the Working Party’s approach, the United States
ensures an adequate level of protection in the public sector and in some areas in the private sector.
It asserts that the level of protection in much of the private sector will not be considered adequate
under the Directive. This Comment concludes that under the Working Party’s suggested approach,
Member States should find that US data protection is not adequate overall, but does ensure ade-
quate protection in the public sector and a few areas of the private sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in information technology,1 particu-
larly in computers and networks,2 threaten informational pri-
vacy.3 These technologies permit data controllers4 ("control-
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY 16 (1992) (defining informational
technology as "hardware and software associated with all features of automatic digital
data processing and communication"). Information technology includes the people
using the technology, their equipment, and the techniques that they use. Id.
2. See Susan H. Borgos, Computer Networks for Lawyers, 24 COLO. LAw. 1557, 1557-58
(1995) (discussing types of networks and practical network components); Henry H. Per-
ritt, Jr., What Lawyers Need to Know About the Internet: Basic Technological Terms and Con-
cepts, 443 PRACTICE L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 23, 26-29 (June 5, 1996) (describing structural features of
networks). A network is a group of computers connected together so that the people
using them can communicate with one another, transfer files, and share resources.
Borgos, supra, at 1557. Networks may be local area networks or wide area networks.
Perritt, supra, at 26-27. While local area networks serve a limited number of computers
in reasonable proximity to each other, wide area networks often span larger areas. Id.;
see also Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and
Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 105, 111-12 (1995) (discussing how
networks that replaced mainframe computers decentralized information processing
and facilitated surveillance).
3. See ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPs'COTr, WHO KNows: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRI-
VACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 49 (1997) (explaining that powerful computers and high-
speed networks make monitoring people's activities easy); see BENNETT, supra note 1, at
22-37 (discussing three aspects of informational technology problem). Informational
privacy is an individual's claim to control the terms under which personal information
is acquired, disclosed, and used. NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PER-
SONAL INFORMATION (1995) [hereinafter NTIA REPORT]; see PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGIS-
LATING PRIVACY 5 (1995) (defining informational privacy as "involving questions about
the use of personal information collected by organizations such as credit card compa-
nies, banks, the federal government, educational institutions, and video stores.").
Europeans frequently refer to informational privacy as data protection. See BENNETT,
supra note 1, at 12-14 (mentioning data protection as more accurate term for policies
designed to regulate collection, storage, use, and transfer of personal information).
4. Council Directive No. 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Indi-
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lers") to collect, store, use, and disseminate personal data'
outside of an individual's control.6 Although this new technol-
ogy has many advantages,7 data controllers also can misuse tech-
nological advances to violate an individual's informational pri-
vacy. 8
In response to increased threats to informational privacy,
countries began to regulate the processing of personal data9 dur-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, art. 2(c), OJ. L 281/31, at 38 (1995) [hereinafter Directive]. Controller
means "the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data." Id.
5. Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(a), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995). Personal data is
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Id.
6. BENNETT, supra note 1, at vii.
7. See CAvouiu.N & TAPscOTr, supra note 3, at 65 (discussing advantages of devel-
opments in information technology); BENNETT, supra note 1, at 20 (noting universal
recognition of advantages derived from use of information technology). Information
technology can relieve workers of tedious tasks, increase speed and efficiency of pro-
duction, and enhance analytic capabilities of a company. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at
20 (relating advantages derived from information technology for government). Con-
sumers can purchase goods with debit cards that withdraw money directly from their
accounts. See INFORMATION POLICY COMM., NATIONAL INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 6
(1997) [hereinafter IITF OPTIONS] (describing how information technology has facili-
tated collection of personal information by private sector). An individual can- order a
pay-per-view movie to watch at home without leaving the house. See id. (noting that new
information technology allows consumers to buy new information services). One per-
son can send messages by e-mail to another next door, across the country, or around
the world almost instantaneously. See id. (stating that developments in information tech-
nology have increased the volume of electronic transactions such as e-mail). Doctors
using tele-medicine can diagnose distant patients. See PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON &
VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 2
(1997) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE] (describing In-
ternet's effect upon Global Information Infrastructure).
8. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 6; see BENNETT, supra note 1, at 35 (describing
increased dangers caused by information technology). For example, a store offering a
discount card might request that customers provide personal information unrelated to
the card's purpose. See CAvouAN & TAPsCOTr, supra note 3, at 31-32 (explaining that
store's request violates collection limitation principle because store should collect only
necessary information). Hospitals may even sell patients' sensitive health records to
defer costs. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ &JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 14 (1996)
(stating purpose limitation principle that proscribes using personal data for purposes
incompatible with original purpose). The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation might
store criminal records indefinitely on government databases. See id. (explaining that
excessive storage of personal information is improper because information loses accu-
racy and relevancy with time).
9. Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(b), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995). The processing of
personal data, or data processing, includes "any operation or set of operations which is
performed upon data, whether or not by automatic means." Id.
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ing the 1970s.1° The German state of Hesse" t enacted the first
comprehensive data protection 12 law in 1970.13 Since then,
many European countries have adopted omnibus14 data protec-
tion laws15 based upon certain fundamental data protection
principles.16 These national laws occasionally prohibited data
10. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 57 tbl.1 (listing years that countries enacted data
protection legislation). Early political action on data protection can be attributed to
the confluence of four factors in the late 1960s. Id. at 46-55. Plans for centralized
databanks, proposals for personal identification numbers, upcoming censuses, and
alarmist literature motivated political action on privacy. Id.
11. Joachim Schrey &Joachim Felges, Germany, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACY
213, 213 (Dennis Campbell &Joy Fischer eds., 1994). Germany is a federation of states,
called Ldnder. Id. The German Land, Hesse, is one of these states. See Helge Seip, Data
Protection, Privacy and National Borders, in 25 YEARS ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY IN COM-
PUTERS AND LAW 67, 68 (Jon Bing & Olav Torvand eds., 1995) (noting that Hesse estab-
lished world's first data protection law).
12. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that data protection is analogous to
informational privacy).
13. Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 447 (1995); see BENNETT, supra note 1, at 124-25
(explaining effect of Hessian statute on subsequent data protection legislation in Ger-
many).
14. See A.C.M. NUGTER, TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC 18-
19 (1990) (distinguishing between omnibus data protection legislation adopted by Eu-
ropean countries and sectoral data protection measures adopted by United States).
Omnibus data protection laws apply to both the government and the private sector, not
just to specific sectors. See id. at 19 (noting other differences between European legisla-
tion and U.S. model); see also Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a
National Level?: Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L.
REv. 129, 130 (1996) (explaining that most countries have adopted comprehensive data
protection laws); BENNETT, supra note 1, at 113-14 (noting that most countries besides
United States, Canada, and Australia apply data protection principles to both private
and public sector).
15. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 57 tbl.1 (listing European data protection laws
and date of passage). For example, Sweden, Germany, France, Spain, the United King-
dom, and the Netherlands have adopted omnibus data protection laws. Datalagen,
Svensk Forfeittuings Samling (SFS) 1973: 289 (amended version SFS 1982: 446)
(Swe.); Gesetz zum Schutz vor Missbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenver-
arbeitung (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz), v. 27.1.77 (BGB1. I S.201) (Gr.); Loi No. 78-17
du janvier 1978 relative a l'informatique, aux fichers et aux liberths, Loi. No. 78-17 of
January 1978, 1978 Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [OJ.] 227, 1978 Bulle-
tin legislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 77 (Fr.); Ley Orgdnica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protec-
ci6n civil del derecho al honor, a la Intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia Imagen
(BOE 115 & 129, of 14 May 1982 and 30 May 1985) (Sp.); Data Protection Act of 1984,
c. 35. 1984 (U.K.); Wet Persoonsregistraties, Act of 28 December 1988, Stbl. 665,
amended by the Act of October 1989, Stbl. 480 (Neth.).
16. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 95-115 (discussing convergence of data protec-
tion policies). Countries have formulated data protection policies in different ways, but
these formulations reflect similar fundamental principles. See id. at 96-101 (relating na-
tional variations of data protection principles). One scholar condenses the various na-
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controllers from transferring personal data to countries without
equivalent data protection. 17 As each country adopted its own
data protection measures, disparities arose between the national
laws. 8 These national laws created potential obstacles to the
free flow of information 9 because controllers could not transfer
personal data to countries that did not have sufficient protec-
20tion. °
The European Community21 ("EC" or "Community") en-
tional policies into six fundamental data protection principles. Id. at 101. These six
principles are the principle of openness, the principle of individual access and correc-
tion, the principle of collection limitation, the principle of use limitation, the disclosure
limitation principle, and the security principle. See id. at 101-11 (discussing presence of
data protection principles in policies of United States, Great Britain, Germany, and
Sweden); see also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 12-17 (explaining European
fair information practices).
17. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on Interna-
tional Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REv. 471, 481 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz, Restrictions on
International Data Flows] (discussing principles in context of European national data
protection laws). For instance, the French government prohibited Fiat S.p.A. from
transferring employee information from a French subsidiary to its Italian headquarters
because the French government considered Italian data protection to be insufficient.
Amy Fleischmann, Note, Personal Data Security: Divergent Standards in the European Union
and the United States, 19 FoRDIAM INT'L L.J. 143, 150 (1995). In addition, Norway, Aus-
tria, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have imposed restrictions on interna-
tional data transfers. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COM. L.J. 195, 199 n.16 (1992) [hereinafter
Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier].
18. See Organization for Economic Co-operation & Dev., Explanatory Memoran-
dum to Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Per-
sonal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58 final, Sept. 23, 1980, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 422, 427 [hereinafter OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum] (explaining
that data protection laws that OECD member states adopted assumed different forms).
19. See NUTGER, supra note 14, at 225-26 (describing free flow of information as
one of two competing interests of data protection). Article 10(1) of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR")
protects the free flow of information:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter ECHR].
20. See OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, at 427 (noting
that disparities in legislation created obstacles to free flow of information); Schwartz,
Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at 472 (discussing regulation of
international data flows).
21. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
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acted legislation to overcome these obstacles to the free flow of
information while still protecting personal data.22 The EC's
Council of the European Union 23 ("Council") and the European
Parliament 24 ("Parliament") adopted Directive 95/46/EC21 ("Di-
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by
Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'1 Pub. Off. 1987). The
Treaty on European Union ("TEU") represents a stage in the process of creating an
"ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." TEU, supra, art. A, 2, O.J. C 224/1,
at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727. The TEU established the European Union ("EU"
or "Union") comprised of the three elements (or "pillars"). P.S.R.F. MATHIUSEN, A
GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (6' ed. 1995); see TEU, supra, art. A, 1 3, O.J. C 224/
1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727 (stating that "[t]he Union shall be founded on
the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of co-operation
established by the Treaty."). The three pillars that the Europe Union is founded upon
are the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Co-opera-
tion in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs, respectively. MATHIJSEN, supra, at 4. The
European Communities, the first pillar of the Union, refers to three European commu-
nities already in existence; the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), the
European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"), and the European Economic Com-
munity ("EEC"). Id. As of the signing of the TEU, the term European Community
("EC" or "Community") replaces the term European Economic Community. TEU,
supra, art. G, O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728; MATHIJSEN, supra, at 4.
Because the European Community conducts almost all aspects of the European Com-
munities, the prevalent term referring to the Communities is the "Community". MATHIJ-
SEN, supra, at 4.
The 12 Member States that signed the TEU were Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom. TEU, supra, pmbl., OJ. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
725-26. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden increased the EU member-
ship to fifteen states. EC Treaty, supra, art. 148(2), at 680, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 as
amended by Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden and the
Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union is Founded, art. 15, O.J. C
241/21, at 24 (1994) as amended by Council Decision of 1 January 1995, art. 8, O.J. L 1/
1, at 3 (1995).
22. Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 8, O.J. L 281/31, at 32 (1995).
23. See EC Treaty, supra note 21, arts. 145-154, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-82 (setting
forth powers of Council of Ministers). The Council of Ministers ("Council") consists of
ministers representing each Member State. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 51 (1993) [hereinafter BERMANN ET AL.].
The Council functions as the collective head of state of the European Community by
conducting external relations. Id. The Council shares legislative power with the Parlia-
ment, and in some areas, exercises exclusive power. See MATHIJSEN, supra note 21, at 57-
59 (describing powers of Council).
24. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 137, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676. The role of the
European Parliament ("Parliament"), originally called the Assembly, is to express the
political sentiments of the Member State populations. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at
63. Parliament is composed of 626 members selected by direct election. Id. at 64;
GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAw 32 (1998) [hereinafter BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT]. Besides
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rective") to harmonize 26 the national data protection laws of EC
Member States.2' The drafters recognized that if the Directive
harmonized the Members States' laws,28 then Member States
could transfer data to other Member States while still safeguard-
ing the fundamental rights and freedoms29 of their citizens. 0 If
controllers in a Member State transferred data to a third coun-
try 1 that failed to protect personal data, however, then the
Members State's protection of personal data would be effectively
lost once the Member State transferred the data to the third
country.3 2 Consequently, the Directive includes provisions on
serving as a forum for discussing topics of interest to the peoples of the Member States,
the Parliament shares limited legislative power with the Commission and the Council.
Id. at 66-67. This legislative power has been increased through the various amendments
to the original EEC Treaty. Id. at 66-68. See generally, EC Treaty, supra note 21, arts. 137-
144, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676-79 (governing powers of Parliament).
25. Directive, supra note 4, O.J. L 281/31 (1995); see Rosario Imperiali d'Afflitto,
European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Rights and Computerized Information, 41 VILL.
L. REv. 305 (1996) (analyzing articles of Directive 95/46/EC (the "Directive")).
26. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Rows, supra note 17, at 481 (defin-
ing harmonization). Harmonization is a term of EC law that refers to legally binding
measures that require the Member States to enact substantially similar legal rules. Id.
The translations of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC
Treaty") used the term approximation, not harmonization, but the later term better
conveys the meaning used in the EEC Treaty languages. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note
23, at 430 (explaining concept of harmonization under Article 100 of EEC Treaty).
The Directive refers to the original translation of this principle of harmonization where
it mentions the need for "Community action to approximate" data protection laws of
Member States. Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 8, Oj. L 281/31, at 32 (1995).
27. See Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 8, O.J. L 281/31, at 32 (1995) (stating
that " [c]ommunity action to approximate [data protection] laws is therefore needed").
28. See TEU, supra note 21, pmbl., O.J. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
725 (listing 12 Member States as of 1992); BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 24, at 4 (noting accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995). The 15 cur-
rent Member States of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. BUTTERWORTH'S EXPERT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN
UNION 136 (J6rg Monar et al. eds., 1996); see BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 24, at 26, 31 (listing new allocation of votes and Parliamentary seats for each of 15
Member States).
29. Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 1(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995). The
Directive refers to the fundamental rights recognized in Member State constitutions
and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms. Id. recitals para. 1, O.J. L 281/31, at 31 (1995); ECHR, supra note 19.
30. Directive, supra note 4, recitals paras. 9-10, O.J. L 281/31, at 32 (1995).
31. Id. art. 25(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 45 (1995). The Directive does not define
"third country", but uses the term to refer to non-Member States of the European Com-
munity. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 41 (1997) (referring to
third countries under Article 25(1) as "nonmember states").
32. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Rlows, supra note 17, at 472 (dis-
938 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:932
preventing data from being sent 'to countries without sufficient
data protection. 33
Article 25 of the Directive prohibits Member States from
transferring data to a third country unless the third country en-
sures an adequate level of protection. 4 While Article 26 of the
Directive35 ("Article 26") provides exceptions to the requirement
of adequate protection in third countries, 36 the Article 25 re-
quirement that a third country have adequate protection could
lead to a data or information embargo.3 7 For instance, if the
laws of a third country, perhaps the United States, do not pro-
vide adequate protection of personal data, then a controller in a
Member State could not transfer personal data to the United
States unless an exception applied.
This information embargo could have serious consequences
in both the Member States and the United States. 9 For exam-
ple, a Member State government might not be able to send in-
cussing need for data protection laws to ensure data transfers beyond borders of Eu-
rope).
33. Directive, supra note 4, arts. 25-26, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995); see Explana-
tory Memorandum of Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, COM (92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 34 (Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal] (stating that "[w]ithout such a
provision the Community's efforts to guarantee a high level of protection for individu-
als could be nullified by transfers to other countries in which the protection provided is
inadequate.").
34. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 45 (1995) (stating that
"the transfer to a third country of personal data... may take place only if ... the third
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.").
35. Id. art. 26, O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
36. See id. art. 26, O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (setting forth exceptions from Arti-
cle 25 of Directive).
37. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at 472 (refer-
ring to data embargo order as orders that block or limit foreign transfers of data).
38. See Directive, supra note 4, arts. 25-26, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting
forth requirement that third country have adequate level of protection, but providing
certain exceptions to this requirement).
39. See Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the
Public Interest, 80 IowA L. REv. 431, 438 (1995) (discussing consequences to U.S. busi-
nesses); Robert G. Boehmer & Todd S. Palmer, The 1992 ECData Protection Proposal: An
Examination of its Implications for U.S. Businesses and U.S. Privacy Law, 31 AM. Bus. L.
265, 308-11 (1993) (explaining Directive's implication for information systems manage-
ment, human resource management, strategic management, and U.S. data protection
law); Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv.
295, 331-33 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz, Health Care Reform] (discussing consequences
of Directive regarding medical data).
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formation to the United States about individuals in the third
country."a A Member State might prevent a private bank in the
Member State from transmitting information about its custom-
ers to U.S. financial institutions.41 Likewise, a Member State
might prohibit a European employer from sending information
about its employees to U.S. subsidiaries.4 2
Whether Member States prohibit data transfers to a third
country depends upon whether the third country has adequate
protection.4 Although experts have written about the Directive
extensively,44 they have not reached a consensus as to what will
qualify as adequate protection of personal data.4 5 In part, this
lack of agreement results from the Directive's ambiguity.4 6 Re-
cently, however, the Working Party on the Protection of Individ-
uals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data47 ("Working
40. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at 475-76,
489 (describing German, British, and Dutch data protection laws that permit data pro-
tection authorities to prevent international transfers by government).
41. See Data Protection: Draft EEC Directive Strongly Criticized by Banking Sector, EUR.
INFO. SERVICE, TECH EUR., June 1, 1991 available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File
(discussing possibility that Directive will prevent electronics transfers of funds to coun-
tries without adequate protection).
42. See Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and Private
Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector
Worker, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 51, 83 (1995) (stating that U.S. business with offices in EC
Member States will have problems transferring even employee rosters to offices in
United States).
43. Directive, supra note 4, art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45 (1995).
44. See, e.g., Simitis, supra note 13 (discussing compromises reached to enact Direc-
tive); Cate, supra note 39 (outlining provisions of Directive and potential problems that
Article 25 may have upon international data transfers); Schwartz, Restrictions on Interna-
tional Data Flows, supra note 17 (comparing restrictions on international data flows of
both European data protection laws and EC Directive); Gellman, supra note 14, at 129
(analyzing need for international data protection regulation).
45. See CATE, supra note 31, at 98 (noting that Europe and United States share
many, but not all, data protection principles); Gellman, supra note 14, at 157 (noting
uncertainty of how provisions on adequate protection will be interpreted and applied).
46. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25, 0.J. L 281/31, at 45 (1995) (requiring data
transfers to third countries only if third country has adequate level of protection, but
not exploring meaning of adequate protection). The Directive does not explicitly set
forth a standard for adequate protection. Id.
47. Id. arts. 29-30, O.J. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995). Article 29 of the Directive estab-
lishes the Working Party "on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Process-
ing of Personal Data ("Working Party")." to examine the application of national data
protection measures and make recommendations to the Etropean Commission ("Com-
mission") to improve implementation of the Directive. Id.
The Commission, the executive organ of the European Community, oversees and
implements the requirements of EC foundational treaties. See BERMANN ET AL., supra
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Party") adopted a paper discussing possible ways to assess ade-
quacy. 48 That paper provides insight into how Community insti-
tutions and the Member States might assess adequacy.4 9
This Comment addresses how the U.S. protection of per-
sonal data will fare when judged against the adequacy standard
of the Directive. Part I explains what data protection is and
traces the development of data protection law in Europe and the
United States. It then analyzes the current approaches to data
protection in both the Community and the United States. Part
II discusses different approaches to assessing adequacy. It pro-
poses that the Article 2950 Working Party presents the only clear
explanation of how to assess when a third country ensures ade-
quate protection of personal data. Part II then. describes the
Working Party's approach to assessing what constitutes adequate
protection. Part III argues that under the Working Party's ap-
proach, the United States ensures an adequate level of protec-
tion in the public sector and in some areas in the private sector.
It asserts that the level of protection in much of the private sec-
tor will not be considered adequate under the Directive. This
Comment concludes that under the Working Party's suggested
approach, Member States should find that U.S. data protection
is not adequate overall, but does ensure adequate protection in
the public sector and a few areas of the private sector.
note 23, at 57 (listing executive tasks f Commission); MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COUNCIL
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 339 tbl.XIV.2.1 (1995) (enumerating Commission powers and
duties, including advisory, management, regulatory, and safeguarding measures). The
Commission has 20 members, two from each of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom, and one from each of the other Member States. See BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 58 (noting that smaller Member States nominate one member of Com-
mission while larger Member States nominate two); BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 24, at 28 (explaining that Commission has 20 members because three new
Member States will nominate only one member each). The Commission exercises its
broad legislative and administrative powers with independence from the Member
States. See id. at 57-60 (discussing composition, operation, and development of Commis-
sion). See generally EC Treaty, supra note 21, arts. 155-163, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84
(governing powers of Commission).
48. Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data, First Orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries -
Possible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy, XV D/5020/97-EN Final, adopted on
June 26, 1997 [hereinafter First Orientations].
49. See id. (suggesting approach to assess whether third country provides adequate
level of protection).
50. Directive, supra note 4, art. 29, OJ. L 281731, at 48 (1995).
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I. DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
For the past three decades, both the United States and Eu-
ropean countries have addressed privacy concerns and devel-
oped measures to protect personal data." In 1995, the Commu-
nity adopted the Directive as an omnibus data protection mea-
sure to harmonize Member State data protection laws.5 2  In
contrast, the United States continues' to pursue its ad hoc,
sectoral approach53 to data protection.M
A. Background of Data Protection
The modern concept of privacy emerged in the United
States at the end of the nineteenth century. 55 Data protection,
or informational privacy, however, did not become an issue in
51. See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that data protection developed in late
1960s).
52. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 1 (1), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995) (noting Direc-
tive's objective to protect processing of personal data).
53. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting Stan-
dards] (providing background on U.S. ad hoc, targeted approach to data protection);
Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier, supra note 17, at 209-20 (analyzing U.S. data protection
by sector); NUGTER, supra note 14, at 18-19 (comparing U.S. sectoral approach to omni-
bus data protection law of most European countries); CATE, supra note 31, at 49-100
(examining U.S. privacy regulation in public and private sectors). The United States
has approached data protection by adopting ad hoc, sectoral measures. See Reidenberg,
Fortress or Frontier, supra note 17, at 209-10 (explaining U.S. ad hoc industry-specific
approach). The U.S. model is sectoral in the sense that U.S. data protection laws nor-
mally govern either the public or private spheres. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note
8, at 7-8. Further, laws governing the private sector address specific industries or eco-
nomic sectors. CATE, supra note 31, at 80; Reidenberg, Fortress orFrontier, supra note 17,
at 210; see Gellman, supra note 14, at 130-31 (describing U.S. approach to data protec-
tion as "'sectoral', with separate and uncoordinated laws applying to some personal
records, and no laws applying to others."). The U.S. model is ad hoc in the sense that
U.S. legislatures enact data protection measures in reaction to particular problems.
Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra, at 506. The Video Privacy Protection Act exempli-
fies this ad hoc, sectoral approach for Congress enacted this industry-specific statute in
reaction to public examination of the video rental records of Robert Bork, a nominee
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 506 n.48; The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2710-2711 (1994).
54. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 500-01 (explaining U.S.
resistance to omnibus or comprehensive data protection rules); Gellman, supra note 14,
at 130 (noting that under U.S. sectoral approach, while separate and uncoordinated
laws apply to some personal information, no laws apply to other personal information).
55. Gellman, supra note 14, at 132.
942 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:932
either the United States or Europe until the 1960s.5 6 As infor-
mation technology developed rapidly, both the United States
and European countries addressed problems related to the
processing of personal data. y
1. Data Protection
Data protection, a European term related to informational
privacy, refers to measures taken to protect personal data.58 The
protection of personal data developed from earlier traditions
that protected privacy. 59 Data protection became necessary be-
cause rapid advances in information technologies have dramati-
cally increased the availability of personal information.60
a. Definition of Data Protection
Data protection refers to policies designed to regulate the
collection, storage, use, or dissemination of personal informa-
tion.6 ' The term, data protection, is a translation of the German
Datenschultz.62 Although data protection may connote informa-
tion contained on computers, the term can cover both auto-
mated and manual personal records.63 The Directive uses data
protection to include the protection of both automatic and man-
ual records.64
b. Early History of Data Protection
The modern notion of privacy emerged in the United States
before the processing of personal data became an issue.6" In the
United States, the concept of the right to privacy, first emerged
56. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 2.
57. See id. at 2-3 (noting that many countries have enacted data protection legisla-
tion to protect personal data).
58. Id. at 13.
59. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 132 (describing early U.S. tradition of privacy).
60. CATE, supra note 31, at 1; see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SUR-
VEILLANCE SOCIETIES 1-4 (1989) (discussing threats of increased surveillance to individu-
als posed by technological innovations).
61. BENNEYT, supra note 1, at 12-14; SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 5.
62. BENNETr, supra note 1, at 13.
63. See id. at 13-14 (noting that some data protection laws cover both automated
and manual files).
64. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(b), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995) (stating that
under Directive processing includes operations "performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means.").
65. See Michael D.,Scott, United States, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIvACY 487, 487
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in an 1890 law review article.66 In this article Louis Brandeis and
Samuel Warren proposed that individuals have a common law6 7
right to privacy against publication. 6' For many years the right
to privacy did not extend beyond common law torts.69  The
scope of the right to privacy, however, eventually expanded be-
yond torts to include a constitutional freedom from unjustified
government regulation of marital and familial relationships.7 °
Many European countries expressed a similar commitment to
the protection of privacy in the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of No-
vember 4, 1950 ("ECHR"). 7' The ECHR sets forth a right to pri-
(Dennis Campbell &Joy Fischer eds., 1994) (noting that privacy rights existed in U.S.
common law).
66. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890); see Gellman, supra note 14, at 132-34 (explaining emergence of new con-
ception of privacy). An earlier American legal tradition protected privacy under the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures and the Fifth
Amendment's ban on self-incrimination. C. Herman Pritchett, Foreward to DAVID
O'BRIEN, PRIvACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY at vii (1979).
67. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 276 (6 'h ed. 1990) (defining common law as "a
body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished from
legislative enactments"); see also Monique Olivier, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention:
Attempting to Regulate the International Trade and Traffic of Cultural Property, 26 GOLDEN
STATE U. L. REV. 627, 637 (1996) (discussing difference between common and civil law
countries).
68. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 198-200 (discussing right against pub-
lication distinct from statutory right of copyright). Reacting to the abuses of photo-
graphic developments, Warren and Brandeis argued for enforcement of a general right
of the individual to be let alone. Id. at 205. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis pro-
posed that individuals enforce this right through tort remedies. Id. at 219. One scholar
stated that the privacy case law that developed from Warren and Brandeis' theory was
incoherent and directionless. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 66. Seventy years later after
Warren and Brandeis had published their article, William Prosser categorized this right
against unwanted publication into four distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2)
public disclosure of private facts, (3) false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation
of name or likeness for commercial purposes. William Prosser, The Right to Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 504-05
(discussing Prosser's categorization of privacy torts).
69. See Scott, supra note 65, at 487 (noting privacy protection did not expand until
1960s).
70. See RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY: VOLUME II at xviii-xiv (1993) (discussing devel-
opment of U.S. Constitutional right to privacy); see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)' (recognizing right to privacy over marital decisions such as decision to
use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing right of privacy for
women to decide to terminate pregnancy).
71. ECHR, supra note 19; see OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 18, 11, at 431 (noting that ECHR deals with protection of privacy and free dis-
semination of information in more general way). The International Covenant on Civil
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vacy for individuals.7 2
While some early U.S. privacy case law and a few interna-
tional agreements had dealt with privacy, concern with data pro-
tection did not emerge until the 1960s.7" Early computers were
cumbersome machines that performed limited functions.74 Ad-
vances in informational technologies improved society's ability
to collect, manipulate, store, and transmit personal informa-
tion.7 5 These improvements, however, posed threats to personal
privacy because they increased the amount of personal informa-
tion available and expanded the use of this information. 76 As a
result of this increased threat to personal information, govern-
ments and businesses in the United States and Europe began to
recognize the need to embrace data protection.
2. Development of Data Protection
After the emergence of concern with data protection during
the 1960S, 77 the United States and European countries enacted
legislation during the 1970s and 1980s to address this concern.78
The United States passed targeted data privacy laws in reaction
and Political Rights ("ICCPR") is another international agreement that deals with the
protection of privacy and the free dissemination of information. International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 11
at 431.
72. ECHR, supra note 19, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230. "Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." Id. The
ECHR also established a right to free flow of information. Id. art. 10 (1), 213 U.N.T.S. at
231. "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to ... impart information and ideas without interference." Id.
73. BENNETr, supra note 1, at 2; see REGAN, supra note 3, at 26 (explaining that
concern for technological changes threatening privacy began in 1960s).
74. BENNETr, supra note 1, at 21.
75. FLAHERTY, supra note 60, at 11.
76. CATE, supra note 31, at 5. One scholar attributes political action promoting
data protection to four factors related to advances in informational technology. BEN-
NETr, supra note 1. These factors include the specific plans to create centralized gov-
ernment data banks in various countries, proposals to introduce personal identification
numbers for every citizen, the occurrence of detailed censuses, and a spate of literature
calling attention to privacy problems. See id. at 46-55 (discussing four factors of political
action on data protection).
77. See BENNETr, supra note 1, at 2 (describing development of data protection as
new policy problem appropriate for comparative analysis).
78. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 5-8 (relating development of U.S. data protection
laws enacted during 1970s and 1980s and their legislative history); BENNETr, supra note
1, at 56-58 (discussing European national data protection measures adopted during
1970s and 1980s.
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to specific informational privacy concerns.79 In contrast, many
European countries have adopted omnibus data protection
measures on a national level and reached joint international
agreements.8 0
a. Development of Data Protection in the United States
While the United States has passed various data privacy
laws,81 it has adopted an ad hoc, sectoral approach to protecting
personal data." During the 1960s, U.S. interest in privacy and
data protection arose contemporaneously with the proliferation
of computers. 83 After the executive branch of the U.S. govern-
ment proposed a computerized federal data center in 1965, the
U.S. Congress held hearings to explore different aspects of pri-
vacy.84 During the 1960s, in addition to holding these hearings,
Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act 5 ("FOIA") in
1966, providing individuals with access to federal agency docu-
79. CATE, supra note 31, at 80; Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 500.
80. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 135 (describing adoption of comprehensive data
protection laws by European counties); NUGTER, supra note 14, at 22-28 (describing
international data protection agreements adopted by European countries).
81. See, e.g., The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a) (8)-(13), (e) (12), (o)-(r), (u) (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (regulating data match-
ing by federal government); The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. II
1996) (regulating federal agencies' treatment of personal information); The Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u
(West Supp. 1998) (regulating collection, use, and disclosure of credit information);
The Electronic Communications Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511, 2701-2709
(1994), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2511, 2701-2709 (West Supp. 1997) (regulating
government access to toll billing records); The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C.A. § 222 (West Supp. 1997) (regulating telecommunication carriers' use of trans-
actional information).
82. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 500 (describing U.S. ad hoc,
targeted approach to data protection); NUGTER, supra note 14, at 18-19 (comparing
U.S. sectoral approach to European omnibus approach).
83. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 133 (discussing revival of interest in privacy dur-
ing 1960s). "By the mid-1960s, concerns about privacy and technology were reflected in
a 'literature of alarm' that was instrumental in placing information privacy ... on the
policy agenda." REGAN, supra note 3, at 13.
84. REGAN, supra note 3, at 7-8. Between 1965 and 1974, nearly fifty Congressional
hearings and reports investigated various privacy issues. Id. at 7. Further, between 1965
and 1972, legislators introduced over 260 privacy bills. See id. at 71-86 (discussing history
of early legislation and congressional hearings concerning U.S. data protection). After
holding these hearing for nine years, the U.S. Congress eventually passed the Privacy
Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 &
Supp. 11 1996)).
85. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
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ments8 6 The FOIA protects privacy by exempting personal in-
formation from the material that government must disclose
under FOIA's provisions.8 7
During the 1970s, the United States improved its data pro-
tection.88 In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act" ("FCRA") to regulate the use and disclosure of
credit information. 90 Congress also passed the Privacy Act of
197491 ("Privacy Act") to regulate how the federal agencies92
86. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 206-07 (1979).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552(7) (C). The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") provides for
disclosures which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy." Id.
88. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 135 (describing United States as early leader in
privacy, but noting that United States lost this leadership to Europe during mid-1970s).
The U.S. SenateJudiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired
by U.S. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., investigated problems with the federal data banks
between 1970 and 1974 and recommended statutory regulation of these data banks.
BENNETr, supra note 1, at 69. In 1972, the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Eliot Richardson, appointed the U.S. Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems ("Advisory Committee") to analyze and make recom-
mendations about the danger of computerized information systems. Id. at 70; REGAN,
supra note 3, at 74-75. In 1972, the Advisory Committee presented a report containing
a code of fair information practices that became the basis for various U.S. privacy laws.
Id. at 70-71. Further, scholarly analysis of privacy problems complemented these gov-
ernment investigations. BENNETr, supra note 1, at 70; REGAN, supra note 3, at 75.
89. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-508, 84 Stat. 1128, (codified in
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u (West Supp.
1998)). Two years earlier, U.S. Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 ("Crime Control Act"). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994), amended
by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (West Supp. 1997) (limiting use of wiretaps). Although
U.S. Congress passed the Crime Control Act two years before the FCRA, this law ad-
dresses communication privacy more than informaation privacy. See REGAN, supra note 3,
at 123 (discussing Omnibus Crime Control Act in section on communication privacy
rather than information privacy).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-18681t.
91. See The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified in 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)) (providing safeguards for individuals against
invasions of personal privacy by enabling individuals to obtain personal records that
federal agencies maintain and by requiring that those agencies only retain information
relevant to specific and legal purpose). The U.S. Congress passed the Privacy Act
largely as a result of the revelation of government misuses of information that occurred
during the Watergate Scandal. REGAN, supra note 3, at 8; see BENNETT, supra note 1, at
71-72 (discussing Watergate crisis as opening policy window for privacy legislation). See
generally REGAN, supra note 3, at 71-90 (discussing legislative history of Privacy Act).
92. See The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (1994 & Supp. 111996)
(defining federal agencies as "any executive department, military department, Govern-
ment corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the
executive branch of the Government ... or any independent regulatory agency.").
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treat personal information.93 The Privacy Act and the FCRA ex-
emplify the ad hoc, sectoral approach because Congress enacted
these statutes in response to concern over data protection and
both these statutes regulate specific areas. 4 In 1974, the.Privacy
Act established the Privacy Protection Study Commission95
("PPSC") as a temporary organization to review and report on
the treatment of personal information within both the public
and private sectors.9 6 Among the PPSC's many suggestions to
improve the protection of privacy, it recommended that the
United States establish an independent Federal Privacy Board to
regulate the treatment of personal data in the private sector.97
Congress never acted upon this recommendation.9"
During the 1980s, the United States continued to adopt ad
hoc, sectoral legislative measures. 99 For example, in response to
increased use of data matching °° during the late 197 0s and the
early 1980s, the U.S. Congress passed the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 198811 to establish procedural lim-
itations on the federal government's data matching. 102 Similarly,
93. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); see Scott,
supra note 65, at 491-96 (discussing protections of Privacy Act). U.S. Constitutional
principles permit the government to regulate its own actions, but discourage regulation
of relationships between individuals. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 9.
94. ScHwARTrz & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 20; see NUGTER, supra note 14, at 18-
19 (classifying U.S. laws specifically targeting credit or government records as sectoral);
Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Finan-
cial Services, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. S137, S149 (1992) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Obstacle
Course] (citing FCRA as example of ad hoc legislation in financial services).
95. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 81-82 (explaining that Congress established Privacy
Protection Study Commission as part of compromise between U.S. House of Represent-
atives and U.S. Senate bills on Privacy Act).
96. Gellman, supra note 14, at 134; The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88
Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)).
97. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 84-85.
98. See id. at 85 (noting that "no legislation resulted directly from the recommen-
dations of the Privacy Protection Study Commission.").
99. See NUGTER, supra note 14, at 18-19 (suggesting that U.S. sectoral approach had
continued until 1990).
100. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 100-01. Data matching involves
electronic comparison of computerized files with other computerized files to find indi-
viduals included on more than one file. Id.; REGAN, supra note 3, at 86.
101. See The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (1994 & Supp. 111996) (regulating data match-
ing by federal government).
102. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 92-99 (discussing legislative history of Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act).
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the adoption of the Video Privacy Protection Act' exemplifies
this U.S. ad hoc, sectoral approach.10 4 Reacting to a perceived
crisis with video rentals, Congress enacted the Video Privacy Pro-
tection Act to address the treatment of video rental and sale
records.1 0 5  Other data protection measures that the United
States adopted during the 1980s also represent the ad hoc,
sectoral approach to data protection. 0 6
b. Development of Data Protection in Europe
Although many European countries and the United States
began to address data protection during the 1960s, European
countries adopted more comprehensive data protection meas-
ures than the United States.10 7 In 1968, the Council of Eu-
rope's10 8 ("COE") Parliamentary Assembly'0 9 asked its Commit-
tee of Ministers 10 to determine whether the ECHR and the do-
mestic law of COE member states covered the processing of
personal data."' The Committee of Ministers ascertained that
103. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (1994).
104. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining how Congress
enacted Video Privacy Protection Act in reaction to data privacy problem and how act is
narrowly targeted).
105. Id. The perceived crisis involved the publication of a list of Robert Bork's
video rentals during his nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 10-11.
106. See, e.g., The Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (regu-
lating treatment of cable television subscriber information); The Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511, 2701-2709 (1994), amended by 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2511, 2701-2709 (West Supp. 1997) (extending protection of commu-
nications to new forms of communications such as cellular phones and electronic
mail).
107. See CATE, supra note 31, at 32 (noting Europe as source for most comprehen-
sive data protection legislation).
108. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES 9 (4th ed. 1987); see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 3-4 (describing origin and
achievements of Council of Europe); WESTLArE, supra note 47, at 5 (distinguishing
Council of Europe from EC Council). The Council of Europe ("COE") consists of a
Committee of Ministers, a Secretariat, and a Parliamentary (formerly Consultative) As-
sembly comprised of national parliamentary representatives from each of the COE
Member States. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra, at 9; BENNETT, supra note 1, at 133. Established
in 1949, the COE seeks to promote collaboration in the area of law and human rights
among the democratic states of Europe. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 133.
109. See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 108, at 9 (explaining that Parliamentary As-
sembly is component of COE and consists of parliamentary delegates of Member
States).
110. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 133. The Committee of Ministers is the COE's in-
tergovernmental ruling body. Id.
111. Council of Euro., Draft Explanatory Report on the Draft Convention for the
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the then current law1 12 dealt with privacy issues in a general way,
but not with regard to data processing.113 Motivated by these
findings, the Committee of Ministers adopted two resolutions in
1973 and 1974, recommending that the governments of COE
member states implement data protection measures.1 1 4
European countries took various data protection initiatives
during the 1970s. 15 Responding in part to the Committee of
Ministers' two resolutions recommending that COE member
states implement data protection measures," 6 several European
countries enacted comprehensive data protection laws. 1 7 Be-
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, CJ-CD
(80) 1, Addendum (Jan. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 299, 300 4 [hereinafter COE
Convention Draft Explanatory Report]; Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Rec-
ommendation No. 509 (1968).
112. See OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 11, at 431
(explaining that ECHR and ICCPR did not deal with privacy vis-a-vis processing of per-
sonal data); ECHR, supra note 19; ICCPR, supra note 71.
113. COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 111, 4, at 300;
NUGTER, supra note 14, at 24.
114. COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 111, 4, at 300;
OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 13, at 431 (explaining
that 1973 and 1974 resolutions took steps to give effect to number of basic data protec-
tion principles, regarding private and public sectors, respectively); Resolution on the
Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-a-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private
Sector, Res. (73)22, Council of Europe, Comni. of Ministers, 224th mtg. (1973) [here-
inafter 1973 COE Resolution]; Resolution on the Protection of Individuals vis-a-vis Elec-
tronic Data Banks in the Public Sector, Res. (74)29, Council of Europe, Comm. of Min-
isters, 224th mtg. (1974) [hereinafter 1974 COE Resolution]. The Resolution on the
Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-a-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private
Sector and the Resolution on the Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-a-vis Elec-
tronic Data Banks in the Public Sector set forth basic rules for storage of personal data
in electronic data banks, but gave the member states of the COE discretion on how to
give effect to these rules. COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 111,
5, at 300. In 1972, the committee of experts that prepared these resolutions empha-
sized that after member states enacted national legislation based on the resolutions, an
international agreement should be pursued to reinforce these national laws. Id. 12, at
302.
115. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 135 (describing European advances in data
protection that began in 1970s). These European omnibus laws governed both public
and private sector and established formal data protection authorities to oversee data
processing and to enforce the law. Id.
116. 1973 COE Resolution, supra note 114; 1974 COE Resolution, supra note 114.
117. COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 111, 5, at 300; see
BENNETr, supra note 1, at 57 tbl.1 (listing Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") countries with data protection laws and dates of passage). Be-
tween 1973 and 1979, Austria, Denmark, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Norway,
and Sweden adopted such laws. COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note
111, 5, at 300. Portugal and Spain incorporated data protection as a fundamental
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cause these national laws were diverse, 1 ' however, the resulting
different privacy standards became potential obstacles to trans-
fers of personal data between various European countries.11 9
During the late 1970s, three international organizations be-
gan to take measures to harmonize these national laws. 121 In
1976, the Council of Europe began to prepare an international
convention to establish some basic principles of data protec-
tion. 12 1 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment 122 ("OECD") sought to harmonize data protection
right in their Constitutions. Id.; Constituicao [Constitution] art. 35 (Port.); Constitu-
cion [Constitution] [C.E.] art. XVIII, para.1 (Spain).
In April 1973, Sweden enacted its Datalagen (or "Data Act"), the first omnibus,
national data protection law. See BENNETr, supra note 1, at 64-65, 161 (noting Data Act
applies to both public and private organizations). The Federal Republic of Germany's
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, in force since February 1, 1977, regulates the processing of per-
sonal data at the public sector and the private sector. NUCTER, supra note 14, at 43-44.
France's Loi relative d linformatique, aux fichers et aux libertds, in force since January 6,
1978, covers processing within both the public and private sector. See id. at 100 (noting
that French supervisory authority establish rules for particular categories of processing
in both sectors).
118. See OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 11 5-6, at
430 (explaining that although various national approaches to privacy protection pos-
sessed many common features, these approaches had many disparities, such as scope of
legislation, categorization of sensitive data, and method of enforcement). For example,
some national data protection laws deal only with computers, while other national laws
deal with all privacy issues irrespective of technology. Id. 9 1, at 428.
119. OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, at 427; see
Fleischmann, supra note 17, at 150 & n.48 (citing Council press release); see also
d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 307 (explaining that "divergences [that] still exist[ ] among
the various national laws may ... prevent transborder data flow").
120. See BENNETr, supra note 1, at 131-40 (discussing efforts of COE and OECD to
harmonize national data protection laws); NUGTER, supra note 14, at 20-33 (explaining
harmonization efforts undertaken by OECD, COE, and EC during 1970s).
121. See COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 111, 1 13, at 303
(describing COE's efforts to prepare international convention on data protection);
OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 1 14, at 431-32 (noting
that COE intended Convention to be completed byJune 30, 1980). In 1976, the COE
Committee of Ministers instructed a committee of experts on data protection to pre-
pare a convention. COE Convention Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 111, 1 13, at
303. After holding four meetings from November 1976 to May 1979, the committee of
experts produced the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Au-
tomatic Processing of Personal Data. Id. 17, at 303-04; Council of Europe: Conven-
tion for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, opened for signatureJanuary 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317
(1981) [hereinafter COE Convention]; BENNET-r, supra note 1, at 135.
122. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4. The Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development, originally named the Organization for European Economic
Co-operation ("OEEC"), is dedicated to the economic development of its member
countries. BENNETr, supra note 1, at 136. In 1948, the Marshall Plan's recipient nations
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laws by drafting a set of international guidelines for OECD mem-
ber states.1 23 Finally, the European Community studied harmo-
nization of national data protection laws, especially in relation to
transborder data flows. 1 24 In May 1979, the Parliament adopted
a resolution on personal privacy and data processing, recom-
mending that the Commission of the European Communities1 25
("Commission") propose a directive to harmonize data protec-
tion laws. 126
As a result of the efforts of many European countries during
created the OEEC to facilitate administration of the Marshall Plan. BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 4. In 1960, the OEEC renamed itself the OECD when Canada and the
United States joined. Id. While the OECD lacks formal lawmaking power, its recom-
mendations have significantly influenced national economic policies. Id.
123. OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 18, at 432-33.
In 1968, the OECD Group on Computer Utilization began to study computers and
telecommunications. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 136. In 1974, the OECD established
another group of experts, the Data Bank Panel, to study privacy issues including trans-
border data flows. Id. The Data Bank Panel's study ended in 1977 with a symposium in
Vienna. OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 16, at 432. In
1978, the OECD established a Group of Experts on Transborder Data Barriers and
Privacy Protection to develop guidelines on basic rules governing transborder data
flows and the protection of personal data and privacy. Id. 1 18, at 432-33; see BENNETt,
supra note 1, at 137 (noting that Group of Experts worked closely with COE).
124. OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 15, at 432.
Prior to the EC studies regarding the harmonization of European data protection legis-
lation, EC involvement with data protection began in 1973 when the Commission is-
sued a Communication to the Council, promoting the development of the European
data processing industry to combat dependency upon U.S. technology. Community Pol-
icy, on Data Processing, SEC (73) 4300 Final (1973); see NUGTER, supra note 14, at 29
(contrasting Commission's and Council's concern for promoting data processing indus-
try with Parliament's concern for data protection).
125. See EC Treaty, supra note 21, arts. 155-163, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84
(describing role of Commission).
126. 1979 Resolution on the protection of the rights of the individual in the face
of technical developments in data processing, O.J. C 140/34 (1979) [hereinafter 1979
Parliament Resolution]; OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18,
15, at 432. After holding a public hearing on data privacy in early 1978, a sub-commit-
tee of the European Parliament reported to the Parliament in spring 1979. OECD
Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum,. supra note 18, 15, at 432. The report con-
tained a resolution recommending that the Commission propose a directive to harmo-
nize data protection laws. 1979 Parliament Resolution, supra, art. 4, O.J. C 140/34, at 35
(1979). The Parliament adopted this resolution in May 1979. NUGTER, supra note 14, at
29. The Commission did not propose such a directive at that time because the Commis-
sion determined that a measure was not necessary in addition to the Convention. See
Commission Recommendation, O-J. L 246/31, at 31 (1981) (encouraging EC Member
States to sign and ratify the Convention by 1983); NUGTER, supra note 14, at 30 (discuss-
ing Commission's 1981 recommendation). The Parliament adopted another resolution
in 1982, recommending a harmonization directive if the COE Convention proved inad-
equate. 1982 Resolution on the protection of the rights of the individual in the face of
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the 1970s, European countries reached two international agree-
ments to harmonize their data protection laws.127 On Septem-
ber 23, 1980, the OECD adopted a document titled Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data 1 28 ("Guidelines") that outlines eight basic princi-
ples129 for balancing privacy and the free flow of information to
facilitate harmonization.1 3 0 These Guidelines recommend that
OECD member states' adopt national data protection meas-
technological developments in data processing, O.J. C 87/39, at 39 (1982); see NUGTER,
supra note 14, at 30-31 (discussing Parliament's 1982 Resolution).
127. Organization for Economic Co-operation andDev., Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58 Final, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]; COE Convention, supra note 121.
128. OECD Guidelines, supra note 127. OECD's Guidelines Governing the Protec-
tion of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data ("Guidelines") are not binding
upon OECD member nations because the OECD has no formal lawmaking powers.
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4.
129. OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pt. 2, arts. 7-14, at 424-25; see OECD Guide-
lines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, 11 50-62, at 442-46 (explaining basic
principles). These eight data protection principles address: limitations on collection,
data quality, specification of purpose, limitations of use, security safeguards, openness,
individual participation, and accountability. OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pt. 2,
arts. 7-14, at 424-25.
130. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pmbl., at 422 (noting that OECD
"[m] ember countries have a common interest.., in reconciling fundamental but com-
peting values such as privacy and the free flow of information"); see also Jennifer M.
Myers, Note, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An Examination of
Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the United States, 29 CASE W. RES. J.
I-r'L L. 109, 117 (1997) (discussing harmonization efforts of OCED Guidelines). This
balance of competing values is an essential element of data protection because the
measures that a country takes to protect information depend upon the balance between
privacy and the free flow of information that the country reaches. Jane Zimmerman,
Transborder Data Flow: Problems with the Council of Europe Convention, or Protecting States
from Protectionism, 4J. INT'L L. Bus. 601, 603-04 (1982) (explaining that understanding
interplay between privacy and free flow of information is necessary to understand pro-
tection laws). For instance, although the United States values informational privacy, it
places greater emphasis on the free flow of ideas. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards,
supra note 53, at 503-06 (explaining U.S. constitutional emphasis on restraining govern-
ment). Thus, the United States has adopted an ad hoc, sectoral approach that favors
the free flow of information. Id. at 506.
131. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CODE OF LIBERALISA-
TION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS 2 (1997) [hereinafter OECD CODE]. The origi-
nal OECD member countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Con-
vention of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, 888 U.N.T.S. 179. Japan joined the OECD in 1964, Finland in 1969, Australia in
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ures to implement these principles.'32 The Guidelines, however,
have no legal force1" and permit broad variation in national im-
plementation.1 3 4  Consequently, although the Guidelines pro-
vide guidance to OECD member states, they do not create uni-
form protection laws.1 31
On January 28, 1981, the Council of Europe opened for sig-
nature the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Re-
gard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data ("Conven-
tion").1 36 The Convention sets forth basic data protection prin-
ciples similar to those outlined in the OECD Guidelines 13' and
requires signatory countries of the COE Convention to enact
conforming legislation. 3 ' Nonetheless, while many European
data protection laws embodied the principles from the Conven-
tion and the OECD Guidelines, these two agreements failed to
1971, New Zealand in 1973, Mexico in 1994, the Czech Republic in 1995, and Hungary,
Poland, and the Republic of Korea in 1996. OECD CODE, supra, at 2.
132. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pmbl., at 422-23 (stating that "[t]he
Council ... recommends [t]hat Member countries take into account in their domestic
legislation the principles concerning the protection of privacy and individual liberties
set forth in the Guidelines").
133. See BENNETr, supra note 1, at 138 (noting that Guidelines are voluntary in
nature).
134. OECD Guidelines Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 18, at 428; Cate,
supra note 39, at 431.
135. See Myers, supra note 130, at 117 (discussing effect of OECD Guidelines).
136. COE Convention, supra note 121, at 323. The COE Convention for the Pro-
tection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Data Processing of Personal Data
("Convention") entered into force on October 1, 1985 when the Convention received
its five requisite ratifications. Herald D.J. Jongen & Gerrit A. Vriezen, The Council of
Europe and the European Community, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACY 139 (Dennis
Campbell &Joy Fischer eds., 1994); BENNErr, supra note 1, at 133. Nineteen countries
have acceded the Convention. Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra
note 17, at 473.
137. Compare COE Convention, supra note 121, arts. 5-9, at 319-20 (listing and ex-
plaining Convention principles) with OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pts. 2-3, arts. 7-
18, at 424-26 (outlining basic principles). The basic principles from the Convention
involved data quality, data security, special categories of data, and rights to access and
correct data. COE Convention, supra note 121, arts. 5-9, at 319-20. The Convention
principles apply only to automated data processing. Id. art. 3(1), at 318.
138. See COE Convention, supra note 121, art. 4(1), at 319 (stating that "[e]ach
Party shall take the necessary measures in its domestic law to give effect to the basic
principles for data protection set out in this chapter."); see also NUGTER, supra note 14,
at 26 (explaining legal effect of COE Convention). While the Convention imposes on
signatory countries the duty to implement domestic data protection laws, it does not
have direct effect. See NUGTER, supra note 14, at 26 (stating that "[i]ndividuals may not
invoke the Convention before their national court.").
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harmonize national data protection laws.139
B. Current EC Protection of Personal Data: Directive 95/46/EC
In 1995, the Community adopted the Directive to harmo-
nize Member State data protection after a long and complex leg-
islative process.14 ° With the aim of harmonizing Member State
data protection laws, the Directive balances the right to privacy
against the need for the free flow of information by setting forth
a framework for Member State data protection laws.' The Di-
rective also regulates data transfers to non-EC countries. 4 2 Arti-
cle 29 of the Directive establishes a Working Party to provide
advice upon the application of the Directive.143
1. Legislative History of the Directive
Under the co-decision procedure' 44 ("co-decision"), the
139. See Cate, supra note 39, at 432 (noting uneven application of European data
protection laws even after OECD Guidelines and COE Convention); Boehmer &
Palmer, supra note 39, at 279-80 (describing inconsistencies between European data
protection laws). This failure to harmonize European data protection laws has been
attributed to the agreements' allowance for broad variations in national implementa-
tion just like the OECD Guidelines. Cate, supra note 39, at 432. Also, some signatories
of the Convention have not ratified the document. Id. at 432.
140. See Cate, supra note 39, at 432-33 (describing adoption of Directive);
d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 308-09 & n.13 (discussing Directive's legislative history).
141. Directive, supra note 4, O.J. L 281/31 (1995).
142. Id. art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
143. Id. arts. 29-30, O.J. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995).
144. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694-95; see BERMANN
ET AL., supra note 23, at 79-90 (discussing parliamentary co-decision procedure under
Article 189b); GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., 1995 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 33-34 (1995) (noting recent developments of co-deci-
sion procedure). The TEU created a new legislative procedure under the Article 189b
of the EC Treaty, commonly called the co-decision procedure ("co-decision"). BERMANN
ET AL., supra note 23, at 89. Co-decision applies to harmonization directives that are
adopted to establish the internal market under Articles 100a and b. Id. Because the
Council and Parliament adopted the Directive pursuant to Article 100a, co-decision
under Article 189b applies. See Directive, supra note 4, pmbl., O.J. L 281/31, at 31
(1995) (stating commitment of Council and Parliament to act in accordance with Arti-
cle 189b having regard to Article 100a). Co-decision essentially gives Parliament veto
power. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 89 (noting that Council still has upper
hand).
Under co-deci.sion, the Commission submits a proposal to Parliament and the
Council. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694. In Parlia-
ment's first reading, Parliament may suggest amendments to the Commission. See id.
art. 189b(2), 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694 (noting that Council may act "after ob-
taining the opinion" from Parliament); BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 84, 89 (ex-
plaining that first phase of co-decision is like consultation and cooperation proce-
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Council and Parliament adopted the Directive. 14 5 In 1990, the
dures). The Commission may amend its proposal and publish a revised version. BER-
MANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 84. Then the Council conducts its first reading and
adopts a common position. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b(2), 2, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 694; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 84. After the Council communicates
its common position and reasoning to Parliament, Parliament conducts its second read-
ing. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b(2), 1 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694.
Parliament then has three options. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 89-90
(noting Parliament can approve, reject, or amend common position). First, if Parlia-
ment either approves the Council's common position or takes no action for three
months, then the Council adopts the common position. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art.
189b(2), I 3(a)-(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694.
As Parliament's second option, Parliament can propose amendments to the com-
mon position by absolute majority. Id. art. 189b(2), I 3(d), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694.
The Council then has three months to review Parliament's proposed amendments. Id.
189b(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 695. If the Council adopts Parliament's proposed
amendments by qualified majority (or unanimously if the Commission opposed Parlia-
ment's amendments), then the Council shall adopt the amended common position. Id.
If the Council opposes Parliament's amendments, however, then the Council convenes
the Conciliation Committee. Id. The Conciliation Committee has six weeks to approve
a compromise text, otherwise the draft measure lapses. Id. art. 189b(5)-(6), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 695. Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, if the Conciliation Committee
failed to reach a compromise, the Council could adopt its common position, by quali-
fied majority, and Parliament could only reject it by absolute majority. Id. art. 189b(6),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 695; see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 90 (noting that co-
decision gives Parliament legislative veto, but Council has practical and psychological
advantage). If ratified, the Treaty of Amsterdam will eliminate this last stage, so if the
Conciliation Committee fails to compromise, the Council cannot adopt the measure.
Compare Consolidated Version of The Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 251(6), O.J. C 340/03, at 280 (1997), incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amster-
dam, art. 189b(6), O.J. C 340/01, at 46 (1997), with TEU, supra note 21, art. 189b(6),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 695; BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, at 64.
For Parliament's third option, Parliament may, by absolute majority, notify the
Council that it intends to reject the common position. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art.
189b(2), I 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694. The Council may then convene a Concilia-
tion Committee to explain the Council's views to Parliament. Id. After the Conciliation
Committee meets, Parliament may confirm its rejection, propose amendments, or do
neither. Id. If Parliament confirms its rejection of the common position by absolute
majority, then the proposal cannot be adopted. Id. If Parliament proposes amend-
ments to the common position, then the proposed amendments are treated as pro-
posed amendments to the common position under the second option. Id. If Parlia-
ment neither rejects nor proposes to amend the common position, then the Council
measure will pass whether the Parliament approves the common position or merely
does nothing. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 90.
145. Directive, supra note 4, pmbl., O.J. L 281/31, at 31. When the Commission
issued both its proposal and its amended proposal, the Commission provided for adop-
tion of the Directive under the cooperation procedure ("cooperation") because the
TEU had not yet introduced co-decision. See Commission Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal
data, pmbl. O.J. C 277/03, at 3 (1990), COM (90) 314 Final-SYN 287 (July 27, 1990)
[hereinafter Original Proposal] (noting that Council would act in cooperation with
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Commission issued a comprehensive proposal, the Proposal for
a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in
relation to the processing of personal data14 6 ("Original Propo-
sal"), for a directive to harmonize the national data protection
laws of EC Member States. 47 The Economic and Social Com-
mittee 148 submitted its opinion on the Original Proposal on
April 24, 1991.149 Parliament conducted its first reading 150 of
the Original Proposal.'5 1 Parliament reviewed the report of the
Parliament); Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, pmbl., O.J. C 311/04, at 30 (1992), COM (92) 422 Final-SYN 287 (Oct. 15,
1992) [hereinafter Amended Proposal] (noting that Council would act in cooperation
with Parliament); EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694-95 (in-
troducing co-decision); BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 89 (explaining that TEU cre-
ated co-decision procedure). When the Council adopted its common position on the
Directive and when the Council and Parliament adopted the Directive, however, the
Council and Parliament followed co-decision in accordance with Article 189b of the EC
Treaty. Council Common Position Adopted by the Council with a view to adopting
directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data EC No. 1/95, pmbl., O.J. C 93/1 (1995) [here-
inafter Common Position]; Directive, supra note 4, pmbl., O.J. L 281/31, at 31 (1995).
Although the proposal and the amended proposal provided for adoption under coop-
eration while the common position and the Directive used co-decision, this difference is
not significant because the cooperation and co-decision procedures resemble one an-
other at this early stage. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 89.
146. Original Proposal, supra note 145.
147. See id. recitals para. 6, O.J. C 277/03, at 3 (1990), COM (90) 314 Final-SYN
287, at 46 (1990) (proposing "to approximate" Member State laws to remove obstacles).
148. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 193, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 698. The Economic
and Social Committee is an advisory body to the Council and the Commission, consist-
ing representatives of the Member States. Id. These Economic and Social Committee
members also represent particular areas of economic and social activity. Id. The EC
Treaty provides some circumstances when the Council or Commission must consult the
Economic and Social Committee, but the Council or Commission may consult the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee whenever they chose. Id. art. 198, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
699; see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 83 (describing Economic and Social Commit-
tee).
149. Economic and Social Committee Opinion on the Proposal for Council Direc-
tive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal
data, O.J. C 159/14, at 38 (1991).
150. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b(2), 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694; see
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 84-86 (describing cooperation and co-decision proce-
dures). Under co-decision and the cooperation procedures of Article 189c, the process
by which the Council obtains initial suggestions from Parliament is Parliament's "first
reading." Id. The process by which Parliament reviews a proposal for the second time is
Parliament's "second reading." Id.
151. Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal, supra note 33, COM (92)
422 Final-SYN 287, at 2 (1992).
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Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 52 on February
10, '1992.153 Next, Parliament approved the Original Proposal
subject to various amendments on March 11, 1992.154 Taking
into account these suggestions, on October 15, 1992, the Com-
mission presented the Amended Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive on the Protection of individuals with regard to the process-
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data155
("Amended Proposal"). 15 On February 20, 1995, the Council
unanimously adopted a common position ("Common Posi-
tion"),157 which it then sent back to Parliament for approval.158
152. WAYNE MADESON, HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 27 (1992). The
Committee of Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights is a committee of the Parliament. Id.
When Parliament reviews proposals from the Commission, the proposals are first re-
viewed at committee level. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 80. Then Parliament ex-
presses its opinion and suggests any amendments to the Commission. See id. (explain-
ing that Commission frequently accepts Parliament's suggestions).
153. Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal, supra note 33, COM (92)
422 Final-SYN 287, at 2 (1992).
•154. O.J. C 94/173 (1992). Parliament approved the Commission proposal subject
to 95 amendments. See id. (listing Parliament's suggested amendments next to text of
Original Proposal).
155. Amended Proposal, supra note 145, pmbl., O.J. C 311/04, at 30 (1992), COM
(92) 422 Final-SYN 287 (1992). In the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data ("Amended Proposal"), the Commission accepted two of
Parliament's major suggestions. Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal,
supra note 33, COM (92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 2 (1992). The Amended Proposal
dropped the distinction between the public and private sector made in the Original
Proposal. Id. Further, the Amended Proposal expanded the provisions on notification
of the supervisory authority and on codes of conduct. Id.
In response to Parliament's suggestions, the Amended Proposal also made other
changes to the Original Proposal. Id. at 3-4. With the Amended Proposal, the Commis-
sion changed the Amended Proposal to address processing of personal data instead of
files, to define third party, to apply to non-profit organizations, to make a mandatory
exception for journalism, and to clarify the articles on transfers to third countries. Id.
156. Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal, supra note 33, COM (92)
422 Final-SYN 287, at 2 (1992); see Hilary Pearson, Data Protection in Europe: Recent Devel-
opments, 12 COMPUTER LAw. 21, 21 (1995) (noting that Commission addressed some,
but not all, of Parliament's amendments).
157. Common Position, supra note 145; Council Adopts Common Position of Data Pro-
tection, EUR. REP., Feb. 22, 1995 available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File [herein-
after Council Adopts Common Position]; Simitis, supra note 13, at 445.
158. Pearson, supra note 156, at 21; Council Adopts Common Position, supra note
157; Protection of Personal Data - Council Signals Agreement, RAPID, Dec. 9, 1994 available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rapid File (noting Parliament would conduct second reading
under co-decision after Council adopted Common Position); see EC Treaty, supra note
21, art. 189b(2), 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694 (setting forth requirement that Council
send adopted common position to Parliament for Parliament's second reading).
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In June 1995, during Parliament's second reading,15 9 Parliament
presented seven suggested amendments that the Commission
later accepted. 6 ° On July 24, 1995, the Council unanimously
adopted Parliament's suggested amendments to the Common
Position. 6 ' Completing this co-decision procedure, both the.
President of the Council and the President of Parliament signed
the Directive on October 24, 1995.162 Because EC Member
States have three years to comply with the legislation, they must
conform their national legal systems with the Directive by Octo-
ber 23, 1998.163
2. Explanation and Scope of the Directive
The Directive sets forth the framework of data protection
principles upon which Member States must harmonize their na-
tional laws.' 6 4 The Directive seeks to advance the establishment
and functioning of an internal market 165 which ensures the free
159. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b(2), 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694; BER-
MANN ET AL., supra note 23, at 80.
160. Parliament Decision on the common position established by the Council with
a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data, OJ. C 166/105 (1995); see d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 308 n.13
(noting that amendments were accepted later).
161. EU: Council Adopts Directive on Protection of Personal Data, REUTER TEXTLINE,
AGENCE EUROPE, July 26, 1995 available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Txtec File. Although
adoption was unanimous, the United Kingdom abstained. Id. By accepting the modifi-
cations and adopting the Directive on July 24, 1995, the Council avoided the co-deci-
sion procedure that would require the Council to convene the Conciliation Committee
under EC Treaty Article 189b. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 189b(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 695; see d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 308 (explaining Council's acceptance of Parlia-
ment's amendments avoided lengthy Article 189b procedure).
162. Directive, supra note 4, O.J. L 281/31, at 50 (1995).
163. d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 306; see Directive, supra note 4, art. 32, O.J. L 281/
31, at 49-50 (1995) (requiring Member States to comply with Directive within three
years).
164. Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 8, OJ. L 281/31, at 32 (1995). Recogniz-
ing that the obstacles caused by differences between how Member State laws protect the
processing of personal data, the Directive strives to remove obstacles to flows of per-
sonal data by harmonizing the Member State laws. Id. recitals paras. 7-8, OJ. L 281/31,
at 31-32 (1995).
165. See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 7a, 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 592 (setting
forth definition of internal market as "an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured"); BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 432-42 (discussing Community commitment to completing internal
market). In 1984, after the Community's period of "Eurostagnation" when harmoniza-
tion of Member State law had slowed, the Council decided to promote an internal mar-
ket. BERMANN T AL., supra note 23, at 432. At the Council's request, the Commission
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movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.16 6 In order to
promote the internal market, the Directive balances two compet-
ing values or objectives.167 The Directive takes into account that
Member States should protect the fundamental privacy right of
individuals 6 ' while maintaining the free flow of personal data
among the Member States.' 6 9 To achieve this free flow of per-
sonal data, the Directive attempts to ensure that the Member
States provide equivalent protection of personal data. 7 ° If na-
tional data protection laws are equivalent, then the Member
States will not inhibit transfers of personal data between them-
selves.1 "1 Member States, however, cannot attain this free move-
ment of personal data at the cost of individual privacy. 7 2 Thus,
issued a White Paper setting forth a program to complete an internal market. Id. at 432-
33; Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White
Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 FINAL (June
1985). Because of the widespread support for the internal market program, the Com-
munity amended the Community treaties through the Single European Act ("SEA") to
facilitate the completion of the internal market. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 23, at
436-37 (noting that internal market program may have been frustrated without SEA's
changes). For example, the SEA introduced Article 100a, which permits the Council to
adopt measures by less than unanimity. Id. at 439; EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 100a,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633. The Council adopted the Directive pursuant to Article 100a,
so unanimity was not necessary to adopt the Directive. Directive, supra note 4, pmbl.,
OJ. L 281/31, at 31 (1995).
166. See Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 3, O.J. L 281/31, at 31 (1995) (set-
ting forth objectives of Directive).
167. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
Article 1. Objective of the Directive.
In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal
data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection af-
forded under paragraph 1.
Id.
168. Id. art. 1(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
169. Id. art. 1(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
170. Id. recitals para. 9, O.J. L 281/31, at 32 (1995).
171. See id. (stating that "given the equivalent protection resulting from the ap-
proximation of national law, the Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the
free movement between them of personal data").
172. Id. recitals para. 10, O.J. L 281/31, at 32 (1995). Because:
the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is to protect
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy .... [T]he
approximation of those laws must not result in any lessening of the protection
they afford but must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a high level of protection
in the Community.
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to protect personal data, the Directive establishes data protec-
tion standards with which Member States must comply.173
The scope of the Directive is limited in at least four major
respects.' The Directive protects the privacy of natural per-
sons, but not legal persons. 7 ' Moreover, it pertains only to per-
sonal data, or information about an identified or identifiable
natural person.'76 The Directive also does not apply to the
processing of personal data in certain situations. 77 Further, the
Directive authorizes exceptions to the data protection principles
that it establishes. 17
8
While the Directive's scope is limited in some respects, the
Directive establishes comprehensive principles of data protec-
tion. 17' These principles require that Member State data protec-
tion laws impose obligations on controllers, grant data sub-
173. See d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 309 (noting that Directive sets forth rules to
achieve harmonization of data protection laws).
174. See id. at 313-15 (relating three elements that delineate scope of Directive);
CATE, supra note 31, at 36 (discussing scope and definitions of Directive including
broad exemptions). Although the Directive explicitly applies to automated data
processing, it does cover manual processing if that processing forms (or is intended to
form) part of a filing system. Directive, supra note 4, art. 3(1), 0J. L 281/31, at 39
(1995).
175. See Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 24, 0J. L 281/31, at 33 (1995) (not-
ing that "legislation concerning the protection of legal persons with regard to the
processing of data which concerns them is not affected by this Directive."). The term
"natural persons" refers to human beings. BLACK's'LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 67, at
1142. The term "legal persons" includes legal entities. Boehmer & Palmer, supra note
39, at 282.
176. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(a), 0.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995) (defining
personal data as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural per-
son").
177. See id. art. 3(2), O.J. L 281/31, at'39 (1995) (governing scope of Directive).
The Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data outside the scope of EC
law such as processing concerning public security, defense, State security, and criminal
law. Id. Nor shall it apply to processing done by a natural person in the course of a
purely personal or household activity. Id.
178. See Directive, supra note 4, arts. 9, 11(2), 13, 18, 26, 0.J. L 281/31, at 41-46
(1995) (governing exceptions to Directive); CATE, supra note 31, at 36 (discussing Di-
rective's exceptions). Article 13 provides the broadest exceptions to the Directive's
main data protection principles. Directive, supra note 4, art. 13, 0.J. L 281/31, at 42
(1995) (exempting Member State laws which violate Directive's data protection princi-
ples if these Member State laws are necessary to safeguard important interests such as
national security or criminal law enforcement).
179. See d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 315-19 (examining Directive's main data pro-
tection principles); CATE, supra note 31, at 37-41 (discussing basic protection of Direc-
tive).
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jects' 8° certain rights, and create a supervisory authority to en-
force these laws. 81 The Directive requires that, as part of her
obligations, a controller must maintain data quality8 2 and notify
the data subject of processing. 18  Further, the controller must
notify the national supervisory authority of the purpose for the
180. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(a), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995) (noting that
data subject is person identified by his personal data).
181. See id. recitals para. 25, OJ. L 281/31, at 33 (1995) (setting forth principles of
protection); d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 315-16 (outlining types of data protection prin-
ciples that Directive secures).
182. See Directive, supra note 4, arts. 6-7; O.J. L 281/31, at 31-32 (1995) (setting
forth standard of data quality). Article 6 states that under Member State law, the con-
troller must ensure that personal data are:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes... ;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which
they are collected... ;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up-to-date .. .; and
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer
that is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected ....
Id. art. 6, 0.J. L 281/31, at 40 (1995).
Article 7 specifies criteria under which processing of personal data is lawful. See id.
recitals para. 30, O.J. L 281/31, at 34 (1995) (setting forth criteria for lawful data
processing). Under Article 7, controllers may process personal data only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for performance of a contract to which the data
subject is a party ... ; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the
controller is subject;
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest ... ; or
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued
by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed except where such interests are overridden by the interests for
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.
Id. art. 7, 0.J. L 281/31, at 40 (1995).
Sensitive data such as personal data revealing race, ethnicity, political affiliation,
religion, and health receive extra protection under Article 8 of the Directive. Id. art. 8,
0.J. L 281/31, at 40-41 (listing special categories of data). The Directive prohibits con-
trollers from processing personal data in these special categories unless certain exemp-
tions apply. Id. art. 8(2)-(3).
183. See id. art. 10, 0.J. L 281/31, at 41 (1995) (requiring controller to inform data
subject of at least controller's identity, purposes of processing, and data subject's right
of access). When a controller has not obtained the personal information from the data
subject, the controller may be exempted from this duty to notify when doing so is im-
possible or requires disproportionate effort. Id. art. 11 (2), 0.J. L 281/31, at 42 (1995).
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processing' 84 and ensure sufficient data security.185
The Directive also guarantees data subjects certain rights.'86
These rights include the right to be informed when the control-
ler is processing their personal data,' 87 the right to access that
data,'88 the right to object to processing,'89 and the right to have
the controller rectify incorrect personal data. 9 ' Additionally,
Member States must establish independent authorities with su-
pervising, intervening, and consulting duties.' 9 '
184. See id. art. 18(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 43-44 (1995) (stating that controller "must
notify the supervisory authority... before carrying out any wholly or partly automatic
processing operation or set of such operations intended to serve a single purpose or
several related purposes."). Member States may, however, simplify or exempt control-
lers from notification under certain conditions. Id. art. 18(2) & (4), OJ. L 281/31, at 44
(1995).
185. See id. art. 17, O.J. L 281/31, at 43 (1995) (governing security of data process-
ing). "Member States shall provide that the controller must implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or
unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access,
... and against all other forms of unlawful forms of processing." Id. art. 17(1), O.J. L
281/31, at 43 (1995).
186. See id. recitals para. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 33 (1995) (explaining that data
protection principles must be reflected in the rights conferred on individuals).
187. See id. arts. 10-11, O.J. L 281/31, at 41-42 (1995) (stating controller's obliga-
tion to inform data subject of collection of data subject's personal information);
d'Afflitto, supra note 25, at 318 (explaining that data subject's right to be informed
derives from controller's obligation to inform).
188. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 12, O.J. L 281/31, at 42 (1995) (governing
right of access to personal data).
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the
controller ... without constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive
delay or expense . . . confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him
are being processed and information at least as to the purpose of the process-
ing, the categories of data concerned, and the recipients or categories of re-
cipients to whom the data are disclosed ....
Id. This right is among those subject to several exceptions and restrictions of Article 13.
Id. art. 13, O.J. L 281/31, at 42 (1995).
189. See id. art. 14(a), O.J. L 281/31, at 42-43 (1995) (setting forth data subject's
right "to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds... to the processing of
data relating to him").
190. See id. art 12(b), O.J. L 281/31, at 42 (1995) (explaining data subject's "right
to obtain from the controller ... as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of
data" which is incomplete or inaccurate).
191. See id. art. 28, O.J. L 281/31, at 47-48 (1995) (setting forth powers and duties
of supervisory authority). For example, Member States should consult the authorities
when drafting new data protection measures. Id. art. 28(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 47 (1995).
Further, Member States must empower these authorities to investigate data processing
and intervene when processing has violated the national data protection law. Id. art.
28(3), O.J. L 281/31, at 47 (1995).
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3. Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries
In addition to setting rules for the treatment of personal
data within the Community, the Directive regulates the transfer
of personal data to third countries. 192 Regulation of transfers to
third countries is necessary because third countries, unaffected
by the Directive, may not provide substantial data protection. 93
If a controller in a Member State transfers personal data to a
third country with insufficient data protection, then the legal
protection that the Member State provides such data under the
Directive would be lost once the data arrives in the third coun-
try.194 Thus, the Directive permits Member States to transfer
personal data to a third country only if that third country en-
sures an adequate level of protection."'
The Directive recognizes that when determining whether to
permit transfers of personal data to third countries, the Member
States must balance the Directive's original two objectives.' 96
The free flow of information to third countries is necessary for
international trade. 197  Such transfers, however, cannot violate
an individual's right to privacy.' 98 In order to ensure that trans-
fers of personal data to third countries do not cripple interna-
tional trade while still protecting personal data, the Directive re-
quires that the third countries ensure adequate protection of the
personal data.' 99 If the third country provides adequate protec-
192. Id. arts. 25-26, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
193. See NUGTER, supra note 14, at 4 (discussing legitimate need to safeguard pri-
vacy in international context).
194. See Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal, supra note 33, COM
(92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 34 (1992) (explaining that without Article 25, transfers to
third countries could nullify Community data protection); Gellman, supra note 14, at
158 (describing need for Article 25).
195. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 47 (1995) (stating that
"the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing...
may take place only if ... the third country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection."). In contrast, the Directive requires an equivalent level of protection Be-
tween Member States. See id. recitals para. 8, O.J. L 281/31, at 32 (1995) (demanding
that "the level of protection ... must be equivalent in all the Member States.").
196. See id. recitals paras. 56-57, O.J. L 281/31, at 36-37 (1995) (governing balance
between Directive's two objectives with respect to data transfers to third countries).
197. See id. recitals para. 56, 0.J. L 281/31, at 36-37 (1995) (stating that "cross-
border flows of personal data are necessary to the expansion of international trade").
198. See id. recitals para. 57, 0.J. L 281/31, at 37 (1995) (noting that "transfer of
personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection
must be prohibited").
199. Id. art. 25(1), 0.J. L 281/31, at 45 (1995).
19981
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tion, then the transfer will not violate the individual's right to
informational privacy. z 0 In such an instance, because the trans-
fer will not violate this right, personal data necessary for interna-
tional trade may flow freely.201
Article 25202 of the Directive sets forth the procedure by
which Member States and the Commission should determine
whether protection in a third country is adequate. 20 1 This proce-
dure involves a case-by-case analysis of data transfers or sets of
transfers rather than an overall country assessment.204  Under
Article 25's procedures, the Member States and the Commission
must inform each other of cases where a third country does not
provide an adequate level of protection.2 5  The Commission
then may determine, pursuant to the procedure described in Ar-
ticle 31(2), whether the third country fails to ensure adequate
protection for transfers of a certain type.20 6 If the Commission
200. Id. art. 1(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
201. Id. art. 1(2), OJ. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
202. See id. art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting forth adequacy test for
transfers to third countries).
203. Id.
204. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging
the Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 287, 294 (1993) [hereinafter
Reidenberg, Rules of the Road] (noting that Amended Proposal provided for case-by-case
analysis of data transfers to third countries). Compare Amended Proposal, supra note
145, art. 26, O.J. C 311/04, at 55-56 (1992), COM (92) 422 Fina-SYN 287, at 104-07
(1992) (setting forth case-by-case analysis of transfers to third countries) with Directive,
supra note 4, art. 25, Oj. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (adopting case-by-case approach to
assessing transfers to third countries with language almost identical toAmended Propo-
sal).
205. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25(3), OJ. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (instructing
Member States and Commission to inform each other of particular cases where third
country has inadequate data protection). Thus, this provision, unlike its earlier version
in the Original Proposal, does not require Member States to assess the adequacy of a
third county's overall data protection and decide if a total ban to that third country is
necessary. See Reidenberg, Rules of the Road, supra note 204, at 293-94 (contrasting Origi-
nal Proposal's provision for overall country assessment of adequacy with Amended Pro-
posal's case-by-case approach); Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24, O.J. C 277/
03, at 11 (1990), COM (90) 314 Final-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990) (making no provisions
for case-by-case analysis of data transfers to third countries); Amended Proposal, supra
note 145, art. 26, OJ. C 311/04, at 55 (1992), COM (92) 422 Fina-SYN 287, at 106
(1992) (providing for case-by-case analysis of third country transfers in light of all cir-
cumstances); Directive, supra 'note 4, art. 25, O.J. C 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (adopting
case-by-case review of data transfers to third countries). Instead, Article 25(3) provides
for a case-by-case analysis of third country transfers. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road, supra
note 204, at 294.
206. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25(4) & (6), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (set-
ting forth consequences depending upon whether or not Commission finds third coun-
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finds that the third country does not provide adequate protec-
tion under these circumstances, then Member States must pre-
vent transfers of this type to the third country. 207 If the Commis-
sion, however, finds that the third country does ensure adequate
protection, then the Member States must permit the transfers.2 °8
In addition, the Directive empowers the Commission to enter
into negotiations with a third country that fails to provide an
adequate level of protection so that the third country can rem-
edy the situation. 0°
In Article 26, the Directive sets forth two categories of ex-
ceptions where Member States may permit the transfer of per-
sonal data to a third country that does not ensure an adequate
level of protection. 210  Under Article 26(1), a Member State
tries' data protection adequate). The Directive requires that a Member State or the
Commission inform the other parties of a third country that does not provide adequate
protection for a data transfer. Id. art. 25(3), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995). The Directive
does not, however, require the Commission to make a formal determination of ade-
quacy. See id. art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (permitting, but not requiring,
Commission to determine adequacy under Article 31(2) procedure).
If the Commission decides to assess a third country's level of protection, the Com-
mission must make this assessment under the procedure provided for in Article 31(2).
Id. art. 25(4) & (6), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995). Under Article 31(2), a committee
comprised of the representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representa-
tive of the Commission assists the Commission. Id. art. 31(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 49
(1995).
Under this procedure, the Commission representative first submits the Commis-
sion's proposed measures to the committee. Id. art. 31(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 49 (1995).
Then the committee must deliver an opinion on the proposal. Id. This opinion will be
decided by qualified majority, as set out in Article 148(2) of the EC Treaty, and the
chairperson cannot vote. Id.
If the committee supports the measure in the draft, then the Commission's propo-
sal shall apply immediately. Id. If the committee does not support these measures, then
Commission must communicate its measures to the Council immediately. Id. The
Council has three months to overrule the Commission's proposal by a qualified major-
ity. Id. During this three month period, the Commission must not apply the measures,
but when this period expires, the Commission can adopt the proposed measures. Id.
207. See id. art. 25(4), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (stating that "[w]here the Com-
mission finds ... that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection
... Member States shall take measures necessary to prevent any transfer of data of the
same type to the third country in question.").
208. See id. art. 25(6), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (noting that where "[t]he Com-
mission may find . . . that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection . ..
Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with the Commission's deci-
sion.").
209. Id. art. 25(5), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
210. See id. art. 26(1)-(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (setting forth derogations
from Article 25). These exceptions are very similar to the justifications for data process-
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must exempt a transfer from the requirements of Article 25 if
the transfer meets one of six conditions.211 It is uncertain how
broadly Member States will interpret these exceptions.2
12
Article 26(2) also provides Member States with an exception
from Article 25.213 Article 26(2) permits a Member State to au-
thorize a transfer to a third country without adequate protection
where the controller of the data determines that adequate safe-
guards of individuals' privacy rights exist.214 If a Member State
exempts a transfer under Article 26(2) rather than Article 26(1),
then the Member State must inform the Commission and the
other Member States of the authorization.215 If the Commission
or another Member State objects to the authorization, the Com-
mission must decide whether the authorization was proper 216
and the Member States must comply with the Commission's de-
cision.2 1 7
While the Directive establishes the procedure for determin-
ing where protection is adequate218 and sets forth the exceptions
ing listed in Article 7 of the Directive. See id. art. 7, O.J. L 281/31, at 40 (1995) (listing
criteria for making data processing legitimate).
211. Id. art. 26(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995). The six derogations under Article
26(1) are: (1) the data subject has consented to the transfer; (2) the transfer is neces-
sary for performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller; (3) the
transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in data
subject's interest grounds; (4) the transfer is necessary for or legally required by an
important public interest; (5) the transfer is necessary to protect data subject's vital
interests; or (6) the transfer is made from a public register. Id. The Directive does not
require Member States to inform the Commission and other Member States when they
use the Article 25(1) exemptions. See id. art. 26(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (making
no mention of obligation to notify Commission or other Member States).
212. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 157 (analyzing Article 25 of Directive).
213. Directive, supra note 4, art. 26(2), 0.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
214. See id. art. 26(2), 0.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (noting that "such [adequate]
safeguards may in particular result from appropriate contractual clauses.").
215. Id. art. 26(3), 0.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
216. Id. The Commission will reach its decision in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 31(2). Id. This procedure involves referral by a representative of
the Commission to a committee of Member State representatives. Id. art 31(1), 0.J. L
281/31, at 49 (1995).
217. Id. art. 26(3)-(4), 0.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995). Thus, if the Commission de-
cides that the authorization violated an individual's privacy rights, then the Member
State could not authorize the transfer. Id. art. 26(3), OJ. L 281/31 at 46 (1995). If the
Commission found that the authorization was proper because certain contractual
clauses offered sufficient safeguards, however, then objecting parties must accept this
decision. Id. art. 26(4), 0.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995).
218. See id. art. 25, 0.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting forth procedure for
determining adequacy of third country's data protection).
ADEQUACY OF U.S. DATA PROTECTION
where Member States may make a transfer to a third country
whose protection is not adequate,219 the Directive does not
clearly explain what constitutes adequate protection. 220 Article
25(2) does note that Member States should assess the adequacy
of a third country's level of protection in light of the circum-
stances surrounding. the transfer. 22' These circumstances in-
clude the nature of the personal data, the purpose and nature of
the proposed processing, the country of origin, the country of
final destination, the rules of law in the third country, and the
professional rules and security measures in the third country.2 2 2
The Directive mentions these factors, but provides no other gui-
dance as to how the supervisory authorities of the Member States
should determine whether protection is adequate.223 Conse-
quently, it will be difficult for Member States to determine which
third countries do not ensure an adequate level of protection
and under what circumstances. 224
4. Article 29 Working Party
Article 29 of the Directive establishes a Working Party225 to
advise the Commission on data protection matters and to con-
tribute to the uniform application of the national data protec-
tion measures. 2 2 6 The Working Party is an independent advisory
group composed of a representative from each Member State's
supervisory authority, a representative of the- Community, and a
219. See id. art. 26, O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (governing exceptions Article 25 of
Directive).
220. See id. art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (providing procedures to deter-
mine when third country ensures adequate protection, but not explicitly stating what
constitutes adequate protection).
221. See id. art. 25 (2), O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting forth factors by which
Member States should assess adequacy of data protection).
222. Id.
223. See id. (listing surrounding circumstances, but not analyzing them).
224. Gellman, supra note 14, at 157 (noting uncertainty about how Member States
will apply provisions on third country transfers).
225. Directive, supra note 4, art. 29(1), Oj. L 281/31, at 48 (1995); see Working
Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data,
First Annual Report, XV/5025/97-Final Corr. EN, adopted June 25, 1997, at 4 [herein-
after First Annual Report] (discussing role, composition, and progress of Working
Party). The Working Party is formally named "A Working Party on the Protection of
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data." Id.
226. See Directive, supra note 4, recitals para. 65, 0.J. L 281/31, at 37 (1995) (stat-
ing that Working Party, completely independent in its functions, must advise the Com-
mission and contribute to the uniform application of national rules).
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representative of the Commission. 227 The Directive charges the
Working Party to examine the Member States' data protection
laws and give the Commission opinions on the level of protec-
tion in the EC Member States and in third countries. 228 Further,
the Working Party may make recommendations relating to data
protection in the Community. 229 The Working Party must for-
ward these opinions and recommendations to the Article 31
committee2 30 and the Commission. 231 After adopting measures
pursuant to the Article 31 procedure,232 the Commission must
inform the Working Party of its decision. 233 Finally, the Working
Party must submit an annual report on the data protection in
the Community and in third countries to the Commission, the
European Parliament, and the Council.2 34 Through these three
functions the Working Party has an opportunity to influence the
interpretation of the Directive.235
In particular, the Working Party can influence the Commis-
sion's interpretation of what constitutes an adequate level of pro-
tection in a third country under Article 25.236 By giving opinions
on the level of protection in third countries, the Working Party
227. See id. art. 29(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (noting that "[e]ach member of
the Working Party shall be designated by the institution, authority or authorities which
he represents."). These institutions and authorities shall nominate joint representatives
if they have more than one supervisory authority. Id.
228. See id. art. 30(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (setting forth Working Party's
duties). In addition, the Working Party must advise the Commission on proposed
amendments to the Directive, on additional measures to safeguard data protection, and
on any other Community measure affecting data protection rights. Id. art. 30(1) (c),
O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995). If the Working Party finds divergences between Member
State data protection laws that might affect the equivalence of data protection, then the
Working Party must inform the Commission of the divergences. Id. art. 30(2), O.J. L
281/31, at 48 (1995).
229. Id. art. 30(3), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995).
230. See id. art. 31, O.J. L 281/31, at 49 (1995) (establishing committee of Member
State representatives to assist Commission).
231. Id. art. 30(4), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995).
232. See id. art. 31(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 49 (1995) (setting forth procedure for
Article 31 committee).
233. Id. art. 30(5), O.J. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995). The Commission must also
report to the Council and Parliament on its response to the Working Party's opinion or
recommendation. Id.
234. Id. art. 30(6), O.J. L 281/31, at 49 (1995). The Working Party's annual re-
port shall be made public. Id.
235. See id. art. 30, Oj. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995) (describing role of Working
Party).
236. See id. art. 30, Oj. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995) (setting forth powers of Working
Party).
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can help define adequate protection by identifying the third
countries that it considers provide such protection.23 7 In the
Working Party's annual report, the Working Party must report to
the Commission on data protection in third countries.23 8
Although the Working Party cannot make recommendations
about whether a third country ensures adequate protection in a
specific case, the Working Party can take positions suggesting
how Member States should assess adequacy.239 While the Work-
ing Party has not taken any formal steps to define adequate pro-
tection in an opinion or an annual report, the Working Party did
adopt a discussion document on June 26, 1997 that examines
possible ways to determine whether third countries provide ade-
quate protection.24 °
C. Current U.S. Protection of Personal Data: Sectoral Approach
The U.S. ad hoc, sectoral approach to data protection flows
from the U.S. regulatory philosophy.24' In the public sector,
U.S. data protection regulates the treatment of personal data on
the constitutional, federal, and state levels.2 4 2 Data protection in
the private sector involves targeted regulation at both the federal
and state level as well as varying degrees of self-regulation. 241
1. Overview of the Sectoral Approach
Unlike the Community, during the 1990s, the United States
237. See id. art. 30(1) (b), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (empowering Working Party
to give opinions on level of protection in third countries). The Working Party has not
yet issued any opinions on the level of data protection in third countries, but on May,
29, 1997, it adopted Opinion 1/97 on Canadian initiatives relating to standardization in
the field of protection of privacy. Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Opinion 1/97, XV/5023/97-Final Corr. EN,
adopted May 29, 1997.
238. See Directive, supra, note 4, art. 30(6), OJ. L 281/31, at 49 (1995) (requiring
Working Party to report annually on data protection in Community and third coun-
tries). The Working Party adopted its First Annual Report on June 23, 1997. First An-
nual Report, supra note 225. This report did discuss data protection in third countries,
but did not focus on what constitutes an adequate level of protection. Id.
239. See First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2 (explaining that although Working
Party has no explicit role to give recommendations on specific transfers, its work can
provide guidance on groups of transfers).
240. Id.
241. See ScHwARTz & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 7 (commenting on framework of
U.S. data privacy regulation).
242. Id. at 205.
243. Id. at 215.
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has not adopted an ornibus approach to the protection of per-
sonal data.2 44 , Instead, the United States continues to address
personal data problems through-ad hoc, sector-by-sector solu-
tions.245 European data protection laws actively regulate the
processing of personal data across both the private and public
sectors.2 46 In contrast, while U.S. data privacy legislation ad-
dresses the treatment of personal information by the govern-
ment, few U.S. laws regulate the processing of such data by the
business world.247
The United States' narrow approach to data protection fol-
lows from the U.S. philosophy that laws should ensure citizens'
access to government, while still protecting them from govern-
ment. 248 This U.S. tradition of a limited government enables the
United States to regulate the public sector extensively, but gen-
erally prevents the federal government from limiting interac-
tions between private citizens. 249 The U.S. Constitution estab-
lished this tradition by focusing on the principles of federalism
and separation of powers rather than upon restricting individu-
als' actions.250 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court's rights juris-
prudence protects individuals against the government rather
than protecting individuals against each other.251
The U.S. commitment to the free flow of information also
244. See CATE, supra note 31, at 49-50 (noting complexity of U.S. data protection);
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 7 (describing U.S. regulatory framework).
245. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 7 (describing targeted U.S.. regu-
lation); Scott, supra note 65, at 487 (discussing lack of coherent data protection regulat-
ing system in United States).
246. See Explanatory Memorandum of Amended Proposal, supra note 33, COM
(92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 2 (1992) (explaining that Amended Proposal dropped dis-
tinction between public and private sectors); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at
5 (noting that European data protection laws actively regulate data processing)..
247. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 5 (contrasting European and
U.S. data protection laws).
248. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 500 (describing U.S. con-
stitutional emphasis on restraining government); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note
8, at 6 (discussing U.S. regulatory philosophy); CATE, supra note 31, at 52 (explaining
basic features of U.S. constitutional rights).
249. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 6.
250. Id. State constitutions also emphasize the powers and limits of the state gov-
ernment rather than regulating actions between state citizens. See id. at 9-10 (noting
California as rare exception).
251. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 502 (disciissing U.S. consti-
tutional emphasis on restraining government):
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favors a narrow regulatory approach to data protection.2 52 The
traditional emphasis on protecting individuals against the gov-
ernment led to this commitment to the free flow of informa-
tion.253 In order to preserve this free flow, the government
places minimal restrictions on the treatment of personal infor-
mation by citizens while restricting its own use of such informa-
tion.25
4
As a result of the United States' reluctance to regulate the
private sector and its commitment to the free flow of informa-
tion, the United States has adopted an ad hoc, sectoral approach
to data protection. 5 Under this sectoral framework, compre-
hensive laws addressing both the private sector and public sector
are rare. 251 Instead, the data privacy laws target either the gov-
ernment or business because these laws regulate how the govern-
ment treats personal information differently than how busi-
nesses treat such information. 257 Further, while U.S. regulations
targeted at the public sector occasionally have a broad scope,258
those directed at the private sector generally address only spe-
cific issues.259 To compensate for the minimal legal restrictions
252. See id. at 506 (explaining that in following principle of free flow of informa-
tion, U.S. legislatures respond in ad hoc, sectoral manner).
253. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 6 (explaining U.S. commitment
to assure freedom for press and communications). In contrast, the European approach
to values the free flow of information less than the U.S. approach does. James R. Max-
einer, Business Information and "Personal Data". Some Common-law Observations about the
EU Draft Protection Directive, 80 IowA L. REv. 619, 622 (1995). While the EU Directive's
second objective is to ensure the free flow of information, the Directive's first objective
is to protect "the right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data." Direc-
tive, supra note 4, art. 1, O.J. L 281/31, at 38 (1995).
254. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 6.
255. See id. at 7 (explaining that United States adopts sectoral legislation to mini-
mize interruption of free flow of information). The success of the ad hoc, sectoral
approach is also due to strong lobbying against increased regulation of the private sec-
tor by American businesses. Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 2, at 113.
256. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 7.
257. Id. at 7-8.
258. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 506 n.47 (noting that at
both federal and state levels, legislatures have sought broader regulation of public sec-
tor); see, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); Califor-
nia Information Practices Act of 1977, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798-1798.78 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1998); New York Personal Privacy Protection Law, N.Y. Pub. Off. §§ 91-99 (Mc-
Kinney 1988 & Supp. 1997-1998).
259. Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 506; see, e.g., The Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u
(West Supp. 1998); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2511, 2701-2709 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2511, 2701-
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upon businesses, the private sector has attempted to regulate it-
self through both industry standards and company policies.2 6 °
Voluntary self-regulation is problematic, however, because
neither the industry standards nor the companies' own policies
are binding.261
Despite adopting such a complex regulatory framework, the
United States has no single government organization to assess
the various privacy issues related to data protection.262 Instead,
numerous federal agencies share the task of assessing informa-
tional privacy, often competing for jurisdiction. 263 The Clinton
Administration has established the Information Infrastructure
Task Force 26 4 ("IITF") to articulate and implement a vision for
the National Information Infrastructure ("NI") .265 The IITF,
2709 (West Supp. 1997); The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711
(1994).
260. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 11 (describing industry self-reg-
ulation); REGAN, supra note 3, at 85 (noting that private sectors established data protec-
tion policies to thwart legislation).
261. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 11 (noting corporate policies
lack enforcement mechanisms).
262. Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EM-
oRY L.J. 911, 922 (1996) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Governing Networks]. The Privacy Pro-
tection Study Commission ("PPSC") examined privacy issues in both public and private
sector from 1974 to 1977, but the Commission no longer exists. REGAN, supra note 3, at
85. The Federal Privacy Board that the PPSC recommended was never formed. Id.
263. Reidenberg, Governing Networks, supra note 262, at 922. These agencies in-
clude the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, the State Department, the United States Trade Representative, and the National
Institute for Standards and Technology. Id.
264. See CATE, supra note 31, at 91 (relating history of the Information Infrastruc-
ture Task Force ("IITF")). The IITF consists of high-level representatives of the Federal
agencies that play a major role in the development and application of information and
telecommunications technologies. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, About the
President's Information Infrastructure Task Force (visited Feb. 15, 1998) <http://
www.iitf.nist.gov/about.html> (also on file with Fordham International LawJournal). This
task force is responsible for developing comprehensive technology, information, and
telecommunications technologies. See CATE, supra note 31, at 91 & n.86 (describing role
and structure of IITF). The Privacy Working Group, part of the Information Policy
Committee, develops proposals on the protection of individual privacy. Id.
265. CATE supra note 31, at 91; see WilliamJ. Drake, Introduction: The Turning Point,
in THE NEW INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGIES FOR U.S. POLICY 4-8 (William J.
Drake ed., 1995) (describing National Information Infrastructure ("NIT")). The NII is
"a vast collection of networks, most of them privately owned and operated." Id. at 4.
The NII has been defined both broadly and narrowly. See id. at 5 (contrasting broad
and narrow definitions). The Clinton Administration defines the NIl broadly as includ-
ing all of the equipment used to transmit information, the information itself, the appli-
cations that allow individuals to use the information, the network standards that facili-
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however, has adopted the ad hoc, sectoral approach to the NII,
making comprehensive data protection changes unlikely. 66
2. Public Sector
U.S. law in the public sector provides substantial protection
to personal data.267 Because the U.S. regulatory philosophy en-
courages regulation of the government268 and because U.S. citi-
zens recognize the importance of informational privacy,269 the
United States has developed a system of legal rules to protect
personal information in the public sector. 270  Although the
United States does not have a single law or constitutional provi-
sion ensuring that the government adopts fair information prac-
tices, the United States possesses a legal framework that protects
informational privacy in the private sector on three basic
levels.2 v1 U.S. constitutional protections provide some regula-
tion of the government's treatment of personal data.272 Federal
legislation provides individuals with the most substantial protec-
tion of personal information. 273  Finally, state data protection
laws often attempt to secure privacy for individuals, although
tate exchange of information between networks, and the people who create informa-
tion, applications, and services. Id. Others have defined the NII more narrowly as "the
computerized networks, intelligent terminals, accompanying applications and services
people use to access, create, disseminate, and utilize digital information." Id.
266. See Reidenberg, Governing Networks, supra note 262, at 923 (discussing IITF
sectoral thinking and reactive tendencies).
267. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 206 (reviewing U.S. data protec-
tion in public sector).
268. Id. at 6.
269. See RGAN, supra note 3, at 43 (citing Harris public opinion polls). Various
public opinion surveys during the last twenty years demonstrate U.S. citizens' concern
with threats to personal privacy. See id. at 46-68 (discussing significance of U.S. public
opinion polls). See generally Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES AND ALAN F. WESTIN, THE
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY. A NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH SURVEY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD
PRIVACY (1979); Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES AND ALAN F. WESTIN, THE EQUIFAX RE-
PORT ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMsATION AGE (1990).
270. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 206.
271. See id. at 206 (summarizing protection of U.S. Constitution, federal statutes,
and state law).
. 272. See id. at 206-07 (outlining U.S. constitutional protections of personal data);
CATE, supra note 31, at 50-66 (discussing privacy protections in four constitutional ar-
eas). See generally SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 29-90 (examining data pro-
tection under U.S constitutional law).
273. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 277 (outlining U.S. statutory
protections of personal data in public sector); CATE, supra note 31, at 76-79 (examining
federal data protection statutes). See generally SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at
91-128 (analyzing data protection under federal statutes).
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they rarely provide significant protection.274
While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly protect in-
formational privacy,275 the U.S. Supreme Court has found that in
the public sector, certain constitutional provisions protect vari-
ous privacy interests, including informational privacy. 276 For in-
stance, the Supreme Court has upheld certain political rights
such as associational privacy27 7 and political privacy. 278  By pro-
tecting people from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fourth Amendment also provides some protection of informa-
tional privacy. 279  Some commentators argue that the Fifth
Amendment also protects privacy. 28 0
In addition to the related rights that partially protect per-
sonal information, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually recog-
nized a limited right to informational privacy. 21 The Supreme
274. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 208-09 (outlining U.S. data pro-
tection at state level); CATE, supra note 31, at 66-68 (discussing state constitutional data
protection). See generally SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 129-51 (examining
state data protection).
275. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that Bill of Rights does not mention
"right to privacy").
276. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); REGAN, supra note 3, at 35; see SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 43-90 (examining U.S. constitutional protection of per-
sonal information). The U.S. Supreme Court has derived aspects of the right to privacy
from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments as well as from the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. RECAN, supra note 3, at 35.
277. Roberts v. U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 44-45 (discussing associational
privacy). The right to association has two branches: (1) freedom of expressive associa-
tion and (2) freedom of intimate association. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617, This freedom of
expressive association involves the right to associate "for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 45-46
(discussing right to associate for expressive activity). Likewise, the freedom of intimate
association protects the right to form and preserve certain types of highly personal rela-
tionships. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 49-51
(discussing right to intimate association).
278. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957) (relating need to
balance privacy concerns against public interest); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (discussing right to engage in political expression and association).
279. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 35-38 (discussing Fourth Amendment privacy juris-
prudence); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 60-73 (examining Fourth Amend-
ment data protection); CATE, supra note 31, at 57-60 (noting limitations of Fourth
Amendment data protection).
280. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 38 (examining data protection by Fifth Amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination); CATE, supra note 31, at 72-75 (discussing
relation between data protection and Fifth Amendment).
281. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recognizing right to informational
privacy).
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Court's jurisprudence began establishing an independent right
to privacy by recognizing that the U.S. Constitution gave people
the freedom to make decisions about marital and familial mat-
ters.282 Later, in Whalen v. Roe, 283 the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized a constitutional interest in protecting informational pri-
vacy.284 The Whalen Court found that a New York law centraliz-
ing state drug prescriptions affected an interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.
285
The federal government has created a statutory framework
that regulates informational privacy in the public sector.2 86
These statutory protections were necessary to secure informa-
tional privacy because the common-law privacy torts and the con-
stitutional protections failed adequately to do so. 287 The most
comprehensive of these federal laws is the Privacy Act,288 but the
subsequent statutes have supplemented this one.289 While these
federal statutes regulate the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal information, they are difficult to enforce because an
individual must bring suit against the government.
290
The Privacy Act regulates the federal agencies' 211 collection,
282. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding "the zone of privacy"
under penumbra of First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding right to privacy under Fourteenth Amendment).
283. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
284. Id. at 599; see REGAN, supra note 3, at 40 (discussing Whalen v. Roe).
285. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 (recognizing "individual interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters").
286. ScHwARTz & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 207"..
287. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 70 (explaining need for new statutory protections
of informational privacy).
288. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
289. See The Computer Matching Act and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (regulating federal data
matching); 13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1994) (regulating disclosure of census data); The Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting re-
lease of motor vehicle records); I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7431 (1994), amended by I.R.C. § 6103
(West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting disclosure of income tax returns); 42 U.S.C. § 1306
(1994) (regulating disclosure of social security records); The Paperwork Reduction Act,
44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1994), amended y 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1997)
(regulating paperwork of federal government); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8,
at 92 (noting that numerous federal laws address treatment of personal data in public
sector).
290. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 128 (describing difficulty enforc-
ing privacy statutes); CATE, supra note 31, at 79 (noting enforcement is expensive, time
consuming, and often ineffective); IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 12 (relating criticism
of federal data protection as "paper tiger" with significant enforcement deficiencies).
291. See The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1994 & Supp. II
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maintenance, and dissemination of personal information.292
The Privacy Act permits a federal agency to maintain only per-
sonal information that is relevant and necessary to accomplish
the agency's purpose. 3  Under the Privacy Act, a federal agency
must maintain relevant, accurate, timely, and complete records
of personal information.2 94 The agency must also establish se-
curity and confidentiality safeguards for the records.29' The Pri-
vacy Act prohibits dissemination of personal information unless
the dissemination is compatible with the purpose for which the
agency collected the information. 296 Further, the Privacy Act en-
sures transparency of agency records by requiring every federal
agency to publish annually notices of its record system in the
Federal Register. 297
In addition, the Privacy Act provides data subjects with cer-
tain rights to protect personal information controlled by federal
agencies. 298 These individuals possess a right of access to infor-
mation about themselves 29 9 and the right to request that the
1996) (applying Privacy Act to U.S. executive departments, independent regulatory
agencies, government corporations, and government controlled corporations). The
Privacy Act does not extend to either Congress or federal, state, or local courts.
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 172.
292. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 94 (listing requirements of Pri-
vacy Act); Scott, supra note 65, at 491-96 (explaining Privacy Act in detail).
293. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1). Each agency should collect information from the data
subject if possible. Id. § 552a(e) (2). Further, personal information may not be col-
lected regarding the subject's exercise of First Amendment rights. Id. § 552a(e) (7).
294. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (5) (1994).
295. Id. § 552a(e)(10).
296. Id. §§ 552a(a) (7) & (b) (3). Under the "routine use" exemption of the Pri-
vacy Act, an agency can use or disclose personal information for purposes compatible
with the purpose for which the agency collected the information. Id. Privacy advocates
criticize the routine use exemption because federal agencies have construed it broadly.
See CATE, supra note 31, at 78 (noting criticism of routine use exception); SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 95-100 (discussing broad interpretation of routine use ex-
ception). The Privacy Act permits eleven other exceptions to the non-disclosure rule. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(b); see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 94 (noting broad scope
of some exceptions weakens Privacy Act).
297. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4).
298. Id. § 552a(d), (g), (i); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 115.
299. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1) (1994)'. This right of access is
not absolute, as it is limited by the scope of the Privacy Act as well as the exemptions for
the federal agencies. See id. § 552(f) (limiting Privacy Act to federal agencies); id.
§ 552a(k) (1) (exempting personal information gathered either in anticipation of litiga-
tion or by some law enforcement agencies such as CIA). Agencies also must respond to
requests for personal information. Id. § 552a(e) (3).
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agency amend incorrect information."°° The data subjects also
have a right to sue the government for violations of the Privacy
Act.30 1 They may not, however, obtain an injunction 30 2 to force
the agency to change its practices. °3
Although the Privacy Act provides protections for individu-
als against the government, the Privacy Act does have certain
limitations. 0 4 Its scope is limited as it generally regulates only
federal agencies 0 5 and applies only to their use of information
about U.S. citizens or legal residents. 0 6 In addition, federal
agencies have interpreted some of the exceptions to the Privacy
Act rather broadly.307 Further, although the Privacy Act sets
forth comprehensive regulation of federal agencies, no central-
ized enforcement mechanism exists to oversee federal agencies'
compliance with the Privacy Act's limits on their collection,
maintenance, and dissemination of personal information. 0 In-
dividual enforcement.through lawsuits is generally ineffective be-
cause damages are difficult to prove and limited injunctive relief
300. Id. § 552a(f). If a federal agency denies a request to amend personal infor-
mation, review of this decision is available. Id. § 552a(g) (1); ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, PRI-
vAcY: How TO PROTECT WHAT'S LEFr OF IT 210 (1979).
301. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (3) & (g). If a federal employee knowingly and willfully
violates the Privacy Act, then he may be subject to criminal penalties. Id. § 552a(i).
302. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 231 (2d ed. 1994); SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 115.
303. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 115; see id. at 115-18 (discussing
limited injunctive remedy under Privacy Act).
304. See, e.g., id. at 94 (noting two weaknesses of Privacy Act); Scott, supra note 65,
at 492 (relating limited scope of Privacy Act).
305. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1994.& Supp. 11 1996);
see Scott, supra note 65, at 492 (noting that Privacy Act applies to all executive depart-
ments, independent regulatory agencies, government corporations, and government
controlled corporations). The Privacy Act does not apply to U.S. Congress, the U.S.
government, the governments of U.S. territories and possessions, the District of Colum-
bia, federal courts, or state governments. Scott, supra note 65, at 492.
306. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (2); Gellman, supra note 14, at 164.
307. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 94 (discussing routine use ex-
emption).
308. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v); Gellman, supra note 14, at 164. The primary Senate bill
provided for a Federal Privacy Board, but the House Bill did not. BENNETT, supra note 1,
at 72-73. The Senate and House sponsors reached a compromise by transforming the
Federal Privacy Board into the Privacy Protection Study Commission and giving over-
sight responsibility to the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). Id. at 73. This
compromise gave the OMB the authority to issue guidelines on the Privacy Act and to
review the Privacy Act's effectiveness, but the OMB did not take an active role in this
process. Gellman, supra note 14, at 164.
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is available.3 °9
The U.S. Congress enacted the Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act of 1988310 ("Matching Act") as a reaction
to extensive data matching3 11 under the Privacy Act.3 12 Amend-
ing the Privacy Act, the Matching Act regulates data matching of
federal agencies. 313  The Matching Act does not significantly
change the substantive rights laid out in the Privacy Act, but in-
stead seeks to protect these rights by establishing a procedure
for automated comparisons of federal databases. 314  For in-
stance, the Matching Act requires that an agency conduct a cost/
benefit analysis before matching 31 5 and notify matching subjects
of possible denials or terminations of government benefits after
matching occurs.3 1 6 - The Matching Act also requires each fed-
eral agency to establish a Data Integrity Board to review data
matching.317
While- the Privacy Act and the Matching Act are the primary
federal statutes that protect informational privacy, other federal
regulation supports them.31 8 For example, although the Free-
309. Oversight of Privacy Act of 1974: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98' Cong., 1" Sess. 225 (1983) (testimony of Ronald
Plesser, former Counsel to Privacy Protection Study Commission); see SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 115-18 (discussing difficulties in enforcing Privacy Act).
Foreigners are unable to enforce the Privacy Act because the Privacy Act grants them no
rights. Id. Even if the Privacy Act gave foreigners rights, enforcement would still be
almost impossible because they would be compelled to bring a suit in the United States.
Id.
310. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (8)-
(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
311. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 100-01. Data matching involves
electronic comparison of computerized files with other computerized files to find indi-
viduals included on more than one file. Id.; REGAN, supra note 3, at 86.
312. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 9 (describing Matching Act); REGAN, supra
note 3, at 90-99 (discussing legislative history of Matching Act). Although the Privacy
Act restricts dissemination of personal information, the federal agencies were matching
data, claiming that matching was permissible under the "routine use" exemption of the
Act. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 101. U.S. Congress enacted the Match-
ing Act to address the overuse of this exemption. Id.
313. IITF OPTIONS" supra note 7, at 9.
314. Id. at 9-10; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 101 (explaining addi-
tional procedures under Matching Act).
315. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(o)(1)(B) & (u)(4)(A) (1994).
316. Id. § 552a(p).
317. Id. § 552a(u); see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 121-23 (noting
weak oversight of Data Integrity Boards).
318. See CATE, supra note 31, at 78-79 (discussing other laws addressing specific
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dom of Information Act"1 9 ("FOIA") provides citizens a right of
access to federal agency records, it exempts records containing
personal information. 320 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this
exemption in Department ofJustice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press,321 holding that the FOIA did not require disclosure
of personal information because such disclosure did not advance
the purpose of the FOIA, for it did not involve disclosure of gov-
ernment conduct.3 22 Other federal statutes regulate how spe-
cific agencies treat personal information.3 23 For instance, the
U.S. Census Bureau324 may only use census records for agency
purposes325 and the Internal Revenue Service 326 may not disclose
tax returns without authorization.327
Most U.S. states have no omnibus fair information practices
to regulate the public sector.328  Although a few state constitu-
tions address informational privacy,3 most, like the federal
Constitution, do not.330 More states have adopted data privacy
laws regulating how their state government treats personal infor-
topics or federal agencies). For example, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
regulates when the federal government can gain access to financial records of individu-
als and small partnerships. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1994); see Scott, supra note 65, at 497-
98 (discussing Right to Financial Privacy Act).
319. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996),
amended by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1997).
320. Id. § 552(b)(6) & (7)(C); IITF OvrloNs, supra note 7, at 10. Two of the
FOIA's nine exemptions protect privacy. Id. §§ 552(b)(6) & (7)(C); SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 109; CATE, supra note 31, at 77. '
321. Department ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749 (1989).
322. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773.
323. See IITF OTrIONS,; supra note 7, at 11 (describing other more specific data
privacy measures); CATE, supra note 31, at 78-79 (discussing other federal laws).
324. 13 U.S.C. § 2, 4 (1994). The U.S. Census Bureau is an agency within the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Id. § 2. The Census Bureau is responsible for taking a cen-
sus of U.S. population every ten years. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 224.
325. 13 U.S.C. §§ 9, 214 (1994).
326. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 67, at 816 (explaining that Internal
Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") is part of U.S. Department of the Treasury). The I.R.S. is
responsible for administering and enforcing most of the internal revenue laws. Id.
327. I.R.C. § 6103, 7431 (1997), amended by I.R.C. § 6103 (West Supp. 1997).
328. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 130 (discussing state data pri-
vacy legislation).
329. See CATE, supra note 31, at 78-79 (stating that eight state constitutions 'explic-
itly protect personal data); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that
Arizona, California, and Illinois constitutions expressly protect privacy); see, e.g., ARiz.
CONST., art. II, § 8; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. 1,
§ 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
330. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 9.
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mation.3 1 In fact, many states have a strong tradition of disclo-
sure of state government activities.332 Such permissive disclosure
provides access to the government, but it also may facilitate im-
proper releases of personal information.
While the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and state regu-
lation provide significant data protection in the public sector,
this regulatory system has certain gaps symptomatic of an ad hoc,
sectoral model. 334 The Privacy Act provides relatively compre-
hensive regulation of the public sector, but does not apply to the
private sector.335 The Matching Act, responding to a specific pri-
vacy problem, targets only federal data matching.3 36 Further, no
oversight agency effectively regulates data protection. The Of-
fice of Management and Budget, responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the Privacy Act,3 8 has focused on administra-
tive tasks rather than data protection. 3 9  The Data Integrity
Boards established under the Matching Act only apply to match-
ing of databases, and each one only regulates the agency of
which it is a part.3
40
331. See id. at 131 (stating that 13 states have omnibus data protection laws and
more have narrow targeted statutes).
332. See id. at 208 (reviewing U.S. data protection at state level).
333. Id. at 208-09.
334. See id. at 213 (discussing need for creation of federal data protection commis-
sion to provide consistent regulation). For example, Congress enacted the Financial
Right to Privacy Act in 1978 in response to a Supreme Court decision holding that the
government could access bank account information. Id. at 262; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-
3422 (1994) (preventing government access to financial information without court or-
der).
335. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 92 (relating Privacy Act's com-
prehensive regulation of public sector).
336. Id. at 101.
337. See id. at 114, 114-28 (discussing enforcement of U.S. data protection in pub-
lic sector). An early version of the Privacy Act provided for the creation of a Federal
Privacy Board. REGAN, supra note 3, at 77. In a compromise, legislators eliminated pro-
vision for such an oversight agency and established the PPSC, a temporary review com-
mittee. See id. at 81-82 (describing compromise bill that Congress enacted as Privacy
Act).
338. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v) (1994).
339. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 124-25 (explaining OMB's lim-
ited concern for data protection). Further, the OMB's requirement that federal agen-
cies designate a "Privacy Act official" has not provided significant enforcement of the
Privacy Act. Id. at 120.
340. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(u); see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 121-23 (ex-
plaining narrow role of Data Integrity Boards).
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3. Private Sector
In comparison to U.S. regulation of the public sector, U.S.
regulation of the private sector approaches data protection in an
even more ad hoc, sectoral manner.341 In the private sector, no
constitutional protections govern how citizens treat another's
personal information.34 2 Regulation of the private sector is gen-
erally context specific and company or industry specific. 43 For
instance, the U.S. Congress has enacted legislation to control
how businesses treat personal data, but these statutes target per-
sonal data in a particular area, or subsector, of the private sector
such as telecommunications or employment. 344 Likewise, when
individual companies and entire industries adopt self-regulation,
these fair information practices only pertain to those companies
and industries.3 4 Further, the regulation achieved in the private
sector has predominantly been reactive to problems of informa-
tional privacy. 34 6 Both the federal and the state legislatures have
generally not acted until privacy issues arose. 4 7 Similarly, com-
panies and industries in the public sector have not adopted com-
pany privacy polices and industry codes unless they perceive that
informational privacy has become a problem that they should
address.348
U.S. data protection in the private sector regulates the treat-
341. See ScHWARTZ & REIDENBERO, supra note 8, at 215 (noting complexity of
targeted data protection in private sector).
342. See id. at 9 (stating that ".[n]o direct substantive constitutional basis exists for
the protection of individuals in the private sector"). The absence of constitutional pro-
tections regarding informational privacy in the private sector results from the American
philosophy that the U.S. Constitution generally protects individuals from the govern-
ment rather than from one another. CATE, supra note 31, at 50.
343. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 215 (outlining data protection
in U.S. private sector).
344. See CATE, supra note 31, at 80 (discussing federal privacy regulation in U.S.
private sector).
345. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 216-17 (describing nature of
self-regulation in U.S. private sector).
346. Reidenberg, Obstacle Course, supra note 94, at S148; see Reidenberg, Fortress or
Frontier, supra note 17, at 208-09 (describing ad hoc approach at federal and state
levels).
347. See Reidenberg, Obstacle Course, supra note 94, at S148-49 (discussing U.S. ad
hoc approach). The classic example of this ad hoc approach is the Video Privacy Act.
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 10. U.S. Congress enacted Video Privacy Act
in reaction to the publication of Robert Bork's video rental history during his U.S.
Supreme Court nomination process. Id.
348. See Reidenberg, Obstacle Course, supra note 94, at S150 (explaining that indus-
tries and companies often adopt self-regulation to avoid legislative action).
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ment of personal data in various subsectors to different de-
grees.3 49 In telecommunications and credit reporting, U.S. fed-
eral statutes provide substantial protection. 35 ° Federal regula-
tion of banking and employment is weak, but these subsectors
undertake significant self-regulation.5 1 Some areas such as
health care and direct marketing, however, involve almost no
regulation at all.35 2
a. Telecommunications
U.S. regulation of telecommunications protects personal in-
formation generally,35 3 but a few aspects of telecommunications
require self-regulation because the sectoral legislation leaves a
few gaps.3 54 For example, the Electronic Communications Pro-
tection Act of 1986311 ("ECPA") regulates how businesses collect,
use, and disclose the contents of communications. 6 By federal
statute, it is illegal to collect the contents of real-time communi-
cations, 357 subject to a various exceptions.358 Likewise, it is ille-
349. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 215-218 (discussing varied rules
and policies in U.S. private sector).
350. See id. at 219-20, 265 (noting significant data protection in context of telecom-
munications and credit reporting).
351. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 21 (discussing U.S. data protection in finan-
cial services sector); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 350 (explaining U.S. data
protection in workplace).
352. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 154, 308 (noting lack of U.S.
legislation regarding medical records and direct marketing information).
353. See id. at 219-20 (discussing U.S. data protection in telecommunications sec-
tor).
354. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 16 (summarizing U.S. telecommunications
data protection); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 223 (explaining that United
States aims regulation at particular area of telecommunications rather than at particu-
lar function of telecommunications).
355. The Electronic Communications Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511,
2701-2709 (1994), amended 6y 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510-2511, 2701-2709 (West Supp. 1997).
356. Id. §§ 2510-2511; see CATE, supra note 31, at 84 (noting that Electronic Com-
munications Protection Act ("ECPA") prohibits collection and disclosure of electronic
communications); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 225 (stating that ECPA
regulates collection and use of message content). Regulation of wire communications
involves only public telecommunications networks, not private networks such as those
operated within private companies. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1); see SCHWARTZ & REI DENBERG,
supra note 8, at 226 (discussing limits of ECPA).
357. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Real-time communications include oral, wire, and elec-
tronic communications that are received immediately, not stored. See IITF OPTIoNs,
supra note 7, at 12-13 (distinguishing between protections of real-time communications
and stored communications).
358. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-11; see IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 12 (listing frequently
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gal intentionally to access from a storage facility the contents of
stored communications39 without authorization. 36 ° Individuals
who breach the ECPA are subject to. civil and criminal penal-
ties.
3 6 1
No comprehensive telecommunication laws, however, ad-
dress the treatment of the records of communications.362 These
telecommunications-generated records, or transactional data,363
often produce significant amounts of personal information that
telecommunications companies can reuse for other purposes or
sell to defer costs. 364 The ECPA prevents the government from
gaining access to toll billing records365 of electronic communica-
tions without obtaining judicial authorization.3 66 Although the
ECPA prevented disclosure to the government, telecommunica-
used exceptions). For example, the government may intercept real-time communica-
tions for law enforcement purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 2517. The ECPA also exempts employ-
ers if the communication occurs in their ordinary course of business. Id. § 2510(5) (a) &
2511(2) (a) (1). Further, the ECPA permits interception of communications if one party
consents. Id. § 2511(2)(c)-(d).
359. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (West Supp. 1997) (defining stored communications
as electronic communications that are in storage as by-product, or incidental feature, of
transmission of message).
360. The Electronic Communications Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
Further, the storage facility cannot disclose the contents of a stored communication
unless an exception applies. Id. § 2702; see IITF OprIoNs, supra note 7, at 13 (noting
exceptions to non-disclosure rule).
361. 18 U.S.C. § 2701; see SCHWARTZ & REMENBERG, supra note 8, at 237, 257
(describing remedies for breach of ECPA).
362. See IITF OP-IONS, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that Telecommunications Act
regulates some, but not all, transactional data).
363. See CATE, supra note 31, at 85 (defining transactional information as data
about telecommunications transactions). This transactional data is sometimes referred
to as customer proprietary network information ("CPNI"), or telecommunication-re-
lated personal information ("TRPI"). See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 14 (defining
CPNI as information relating to quantity, type, destination, and amount of use of tele-
communications services); NTIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (describing how TRPI is
collected). Transactional data is personal information created in the course of sub-
scription to or use of a telecommunications service. NTIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
This data may include basic subscriber information, routing data, billing data, and
records of electronic purchases. Id.
364. NTIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
365. See IITF Or-rIONS, supra note 7, at 13 (defining toll billing records to include
records of what phone line caller used, what numbers caller telephoned, when, and for
how long).
366. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(1)(C); IITF Or-rioNs, supra note 7, at 14. In 1994, U.S.
Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA").
Pub. L. No. 103-414, Title II, 108 Stat. 4290 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
& 47 U.S.C.) (1994) (also known popularly as the Digital Telephony Bill). The CALEA
supplemented the ECPA and raised the government's level of proof to obtain a court
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tions companies still could collect, reuse, and even sell transac-
tional data to private entities.367 Recent regulation has ad-
368dressed this informational privacy issue. Most significantly,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996369 ("Telecommunications
Act") imposed new limits upon how telecommunications carri-
ers 3 7  use transactional information.3 7 1 For instance, telecom-
munications carriers can use transactional data only to provide
service.3 72 The Telecommunications Act does not, however, reg-
ulate non-telecommunications carriers.373
Telecommunications providers have attempted to regulate
themselves.374 In October 1995, before the U.S. Congress en-
acted the Telecommunications Act, the National Telecommuni-
cations and Information Administration3 75  ("NTIA") recom-
mended that service providers adopt a system of provider notice
and customer consent to protect transactional data.376 Some ser-
vice providers have adopted this approach.377 In 1995, an indus-
order. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 14 (describing how CALEA modified protec-
tion of transactional data).
367. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A); IITF OIrlONS, supra note 7, at 14.
368. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 14-15 (explaining effect of Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996).
369. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 222 (West Supp. 1997).
370. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (defining telecommunications carrier as provider of
telecommunications services).
371. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing data protection under Tele-
communications Act). Before the Telecommunications Act, no legislation regulated
telecommunications providers' collection and use of transactional data. CATE, supra
note 31, at 85; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 241 (describing federal law
before Congress enacted Telecommuni'cations Act). Even under the Telecommunica-
tions Act, non-telecommunications carriers are not subject to any statutory restrictions.
IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 16.
372. 47 U.S.C. § 222.
373. See id. (applying to telecommunications carriers only).
374. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing self-regulatory efforts in tele-
communications sector).
375. See NTIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 n.18 (describing National Telecommuni-
cations and Information Administration ("NTIA")). The NTIA, a part of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, is responsible for developing telecommunications and infor-
mation policies to advise the U.S. President. Id. NTIA also presents Executive Branch
views on telecommunications to the U.S. Congress, the Federal Communication Com-
mission, state and local governments, and the public. Id.
376. See id. at Introduction D & III (presenting NTIA's system of notice and con-
sent). The NTIA has continued to investigate how the private sector can improve self-
regulation since publishing its report, Privacy and the Nil. FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 7, at 22 n.7.
377. See, e.g., Ctr. For Democracy & Tech., Privacy Policy Chart - Online Service Prov-
iders (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http://www.cdt.org/privacy/onlineservices/chart.html>
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try group, the Interactive Services Association, issued guidelines
on the disclosure of online transactional data similar to the
NTIA's recommended system.378 In many cases, the terms of the
contract between service providers and customers govern the
providers' use of transactional data 7.3 9 Further, many telecom-
munications companies usually treat transactional data as confi-
dential in the interests of both subscribers and business custom-
ers.3 8' Thus, the industry has attempted to employ self-regula-
tion to cover the gaps created by sectoral regulation of
telecommunications. 81
b. Financial Services
As in the telecommunications industry, legislation concern-
ing the financial sector regulates the treatment of personal infor-
mation only generally, leaving many privacy concerns unad-
dressed. 2  For example, the U.S. Congress has not regulated
the treatment of personal data by banks and other private finan-
cial institutions. 383 Statutory measures have not been necessary
to ensure information privacy in banking because banks and
other financial institutions traditionally have protected the pri-
vacy of customer information. 4 New technology has chal-
lenged this tradition, so the financial services industry has begun
(also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (charting notice and consent
policies of four major online service providers).
378. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 15-16. Several online service providers have
adopted these guidelines. Id. at 16.
379. Id. at 16.
380. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 246-48 (describing confidential-
ity policies of various telecommunications companies). Business customers of service
providers often prefer that providers keep subscriber transactional information confi-
dential rather disclose such information to both themselves and their competitors. Id.
at 246-47. These same providers, however, often reuse this transactional data for other
purposes. Id. at 248.
381. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 16 (summarizing privacy regulation of tele-
communications sector).
382. Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier, supra note 17, at 210.
383. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 262 (discussing U.S. regulation
of bank records in private sector); IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 21 (noting absence of
privacy statutes in U.S. financial services sector). While U.S. private banks are highly
regulated institutions, most federal banking regulation addresses insolvency and lend-
ing. H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY - INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE
AMERICA 22 (1994).
384. See IITF OvrIONS, supra note 7, at 20 (explaining traditional confidentiality
on banking industry).
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self-regulation.385 While some industry groups have promul-
gated voluntary privacy guidelines,386 individual financial institu-
tions have adopted internal policies on the use and disclosure of
personal data. 87
In comparison, the credit reporting industry, the first sector
of U.S. business subject to a data protection law,388 receives sub-
stantial regulation.389  This supervision is appropriate because.
the three main credit bureaus together maintain files on nearly
ninety percent of American adults39 ° and the content of these
files often determines whether an individual can obtain
credit.3 91 In response to the growth of the credit reporting in-
dustry during the 1960s, the U.S. Congress passed the Fair
Credit Reporting Act 39 2 ("FRCA") in 1970, the first modern U.S.
data privacy law, to regulate the collection, use, and disclosure of
credit information.393
The FCRA permits consumer reporting agencies to disclose
credit information to businesses with a legitimate need for the
information.394 Under the FCRA, if someone such as a creditor
or employer makes an adverse decision based on the report,
then that decision-maker must notify the consumer of the use of
385. See id. at 21 (describing self-regulation efforts of U.S. banking sector).
386. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 263; IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at
21. Consumers Bankers Association recently issued guidelines for its members. Id. at 51
n.186.
387. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 263 (noting American Express
and Citicorp adopted company policies). For example, Citicorp promises its credit
card users that it will use Visa and Master Charge information only in connection with
Visa or MasterCard business. CITIBANK, CITIBANK VISA AND MASTERCARD PRIVACY POLICY
(1993) (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
388. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u (West Supp. 1998).
389. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 265 (noting regulation of re-
porting industry).
390. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 21.
391. See id. (explaining that creditors use credit reports to assess consumers ability
to repay credit).
392. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u (West Supp. 1998).
393. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 140 (discussing FCRA).
394. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3) (specifying credit, insurance, employment, ob-
taining government benefits, and other legitimate needs). If no legitimate business
need exists, the consumer reporting agency may still disseminate credit information
with the consumer's consent or pursuant to a subpoena or court order. Id.
§ 1681b(a)(1) & (2). Disclosure must be conducted "in a manner that is fair to the
consumer with respect to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper use of
such information." Id. § 1681(b); IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 22.
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the report and identify the source of the report." 5 Further, vari-
ous provisions of the FCRA regulate how reporting agencies use
credit information to ensure that the data is complete and accu-
rate.39 6 Individuals can enforce the FCRA though private law-
suits"' and the Federal Trade Commission has recently taken a
more active role in supervising compliance with the FRCA. gs
Despite the various obligations the FCRA imposes upon credit
agencies and users of credit reports, privacy advocates have criti-
cized the FCRA for applying only to credit agencies3 9 and for
defining the permissible business purposes for disclosure too
broadly.400
While industry self-regulation addressed many of the
FCRA's deficiencies, the U.S. Congress finally amended the
FCRA in 1996.401 Responding to increased consumer criticism
and U.S. congressional attention, the credit reporting industry
changed some of its practices. 40 2 Industry groups began to pro-
mulgate fair information policies.403 Credit reporting bureaus
adopted voluntary privacy standards to improve accuracy and
use of personal information.40 4 Although these industry efforts
were partially intended to avoid new legislation, the U.S. Con-
395. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.
396. Id. §§ 1681c-k. For example, consumer reporting agencies must delete most
adverse information about consumers after seven or ten years, depending on the type
of information. Id. § 1681. Consumers have a right to access their files and the agencies
must establish procedures to deal with disputes over credit information. Id. §§ 1681g-i.
397. Id. §§ 1681n(1)-(3), 1681o; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 304
(describing remedies for violations of fair credit reporting rights).
398. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 304-05 (discussing enforcement
of U.S. data protection regulation in credit reporting industry).
399. See, e.g., Reidenberg, Fortress or Frontier, supra note 17, at 210-11 (noting that
FCRA applies only to credit reporting agencies).
400. See IITF OmriONS, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing criticism of FCRA).
401. See id. at 22-23 (discussing self-regulation of U.S. credit reporting and 1996
amendments to FRCA).
402. See id. (describing self-regulatory efforts of credit reporting industry).
403. See, e.g., Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Con-
sumer Reporting Act of 1994, S. Rep. No. 209, 103d Cong., 1" Sess. 37-38 (1993) (state-
ment of Senators Shelby and Domenici) (touting 20 new credit reporting industry poli-
cies). For example, the Associated Credit Bureaus adopted mandatory information pol-
icies. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 22; Barry Connelley, Credit Bureaus Adopt Initiatives'
in the Absence of a New Law, CREDIT WoRLD, July/Aug. 1993, at 7.
404. See IITF OPriONS, supra note 7, at 23 (noting that Experian and Equifax, two
of three leading credit reporting bureaus, adopted new codes of fair information prac-
tices). For instance, Experian, formerly TRW, published a set of "Fair Information Val-
ues." Gellman, supra note 14, at 143-44.
988 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:932
gress adopted sweeping changes for the FCRA in 1996.405 These
amendments included provisions imposing new accuracy obliga-
tions for creditors reporting to credit bureaus and new reinvesti-
gation and notice obligations for credit bureaus.40 6
c. Employment
Legislation and business practices regulate the treatment of
employee information in the workplace through a patchwork of
data protection measures.4" 7 While federal and state statutes ad-
dress the treatment of private sector employees' personal infor-
mation, these statutes generally target specific employment prac-
tices. 408 Business practices often supplement this federal and
state legislation.4 °9
Various federal laws protect employee information in spe-
cific contexts. 410 For example, the FCRA4 11 protects personal in-
formation when an employer decides not to hire an individual
based upon a requested credit report.4 12 The FCRA requires
that the employer notify the individual of the report that it re-
ceived and the name of the credit reporting agency and that the
agency reveal the content of the report if requested. 413 The Om-
405. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. II,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996); see IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 23 (discussing amendments to
FCRA).
406. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 23.
407. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 524 (noting that legal
rules, industry norms, business practice, and computer system architecture all protect
employee personal information); SCHwARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 349-77 (ana-
lyzing various levels of U.S. data protection in workplace).
408. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 350 (outlining regulation of
information practices in workplace). No comprehensive federal legislation regulates
how employers treat workers' personal data. Id.
409. Id.
410. See CATE, supra note 31, at 80 (noting relatively little data protection of em-
ployment issues given extensive regulation of workplace); ScHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
supra note 8, at 349-77 (discussing federal laws regulating employment sector);
Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 524-28 (citing various federal legal rules
governing treatment of personnel records); Pincus & Trotter, supra note 42, at 66-69
(reviewing current federal statutory protection of private sector employee information).
411. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u (West Supp. 1998).
412. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(k) (1) (B) & m(a); see Pincus & Trotter, supra note 42, at
66-67 (discussing FCRA's protection of employee information).
413. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1) & (3). The individual requesting the credit report
may also request that the credit reporting agency reinvestigate allegedly inaccurate in-
formation and correct the report if necessary. Id. § 1681i(a).
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nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act4" 4 and the ECPA pro-
tect employee information in a specific context by prohibiting
the collection and use of wire, oral, and electronic communica-
tions."' Other federal laws protect the treatment of specific
types of employee information such as medical information,416
payroll information,41 7 equal employment opportunity informa-
tion,418 and information regarding union activity.419 Further,
while many state data privacy laws supplement federal legisla-
tion, these state laws also target particular types of employee in-
formation.42 °
Companies often institute fair information policies for em-
ployee information. 421 For instance, many businesses implement
security programs4 22 and provide employees access to their per-
sonnel records.423 Companies frequently limit their collection
of extraneous employee data to avoid claims of discrimination in
the workplace.4 2 4 These business practices are, however, rarely
414. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (West
Supp. 1997); REGAN, supra note 3, at 6.
415. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511; see Pincus & Trotter, supra note 42, at 67 (discussing
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act's protection of employee communications
and exemptions under statute).
416. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994) (prohibiting collection of applicant's medi-
cal information when not specifically related to job performance); Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1994) (requiring maintenance of certain employee
medical records to monitor and evaluate job safety and health).
417. See Labor Management and Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1994) (pre-
scribing payroll information that employers must collect).
418. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 364 (explaining that federal law
often requires collection of sensitive data regarding job applicant's sex, race, ethnicity,
or handicap, but restricts employer's use of such information).
419. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (restricting collection of information about em-
ployee's union activity); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in hiring, firing, or fixing terms of employment on basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin).
420. SCHWARTZ & RE DENBERG, supra note 8, at 350; see Reidenberg, Setting Stan-
dards, supra note 53, at 524-25 nn.149-52 (citing various state laws that regulate informa-
tion practices directly or indirectly).
421. See ScHWARTz & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 350, 350-77 (discussing company
practices regarding treatment of employee information).
422. See id. at 360 (noting that many companies address security issues).
423. Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 525; see SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 359 (noting that 87% of major U.S. companies give em-
ployees access to personnel files). Further, many businesses permit employees to
amend incorrect records. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 359-60.
424. See ScHWARTz & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 354 (explaining company inter-
est in specifying purposes for collection of employee information).
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transparent 425 and not enforceable.4
26
d. Medical records
In the private health care subsector, protection of medical
records is inadequate, inconsistent, and incomplete.427 Like
banking, even though no general federal statute regulates fair
information practices in the health care industry,428 traditional
doctor-patient confidentiality prevented disclosure of sensitive
personal information.429 Recent developments in the health
care sector, however, have jeopardized the informational privacy
of patients. 43 ° Health care providers are now able to store mas-
sive amounts of medical information.43 1 In addition, third par-
425. See id. at 361-62 (describing lack of transparency regarding how companies
treat employee information).
426. See id. at 365-66 (discussing enforcement of data protection measures in U.S.
employment sector).
427. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 137 (noting one reason for incompleteness is
that Privacy Act covers only government's treatment of medical records); Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1,
6-7 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Economic Health Care] (noting significant agreement
about insufficiency of current medical data protection in United States).
428. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 176-79 (noting narrow federal
regulation protects medical information in private sector in strictly limited circum-
stances). For instance, anti-discrimination laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA") regulate specific aspects of health care data. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994) (protecting disabled individuals from employment discrimination); Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (regulating denials or discontinuances of health care
coverage based on medical status); see Schwartz, Economic Health Care, supra note 427, at
39-41 (describing narrow protections of ADA and HIPAA).
429. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 17; see Gellman, supra note 14, at 138 (stating
that "[u] ntil sometime in the second half of the twentieth century, the patchwork quilt
of health record confidentiality rules was not perceived to be a significant problem.");
Schwartz, Economic Health Care, supra note 427, at 13-14 (contrasting traditional defer-
ence to medical profession with modern control of doctors through processing and use
of personal information).
430. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 17. Although new developments in medical
information technology will cut costs and reduce delays, these advances are potentially
harmful because health records often contain very personal information. Id.; see
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 157-59 (explaining that health care reform is
likely to increase sharing of medical information).
431. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 17. The Medical Information Bureau, a non-
profit trade organization, maintains health. records on 15 million Americans for 600
member insurance companies. See Jay Greene, Your Medical Records - Perhaps Your Most
Personal Information - Also are the Most Vulnerable to Public Scrutiny, ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(California), April 24, 1996, at COI, available in 1996 WL 7023964 (discussing increased
storage of medical data and large number of inaccurate records); see also Schwartz,
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ties not involved with patient care4 2 frequently demand access
to this medical information.433 Moreover, these technology and
market pressures are eroding the traditional doctor-patient con-
fidentiality.434
In the absence of any comprehensive federal legislation reg-
ulating the treatment of medical records,4 35 states and the
health-care industry have attempted to protect personal medical
information.436 Unfortunately, the states and the industry are
not in the position to adopt comprehensive, mandatory stan-
dards. 43 7 'Many states have health-care confidentiality statutes,
but these state laws cannot regulate the interstate use, mainte-
nance, and disclosure of health information. 438 Likewise, while
the voluntary privacy codes and new security measures adopted
by health organizations and companies are laudable,439 they pro-
Health Care Reform, supra note 39, at 300-06 (describing increased role of data protec-
tion in health care).
432. See IITF OPrIONS, supra 7, at 17 (noting that third parties not involved with
patient care include employers, government agencies, credit bureaus, insurers, educa-
tional institutions, and the media).
433. See id. at 17 (discussing increased demands by third parties for medical infor-
mation); Gellman, supra note 14, at 138 n.38 (noting that third parties pay most per-
sonal health bills for most people).
434. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing pressures on doctor-patient
confidentiality); Gellman, supra note 14, at 137 n.36 (explaining inadequacy of ethical
rules that define confidentiality and noting rules do not apply to computer operators
and health insurance companies).
435. Schwartz, Health Care Reform, supra note 39, at 315; IITF OPTIONS, supra note
7, at 18. Legislators have introduced several federal health records bills, but the U.S.
Congress has not enacted any such measures. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 18 &
n.161 (citing recent proposals for increased protection of medical records).
436. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 179 (noting that states have
adopted many different kinds of data protection measures). For example, states often
recognize a confidential doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 180. State common law also
sometimes protects personal data. See id. at 180-81 (examining protection of tort right
against public disclosure).
437. See id. at 179-84 (relating deficiencies of state medical record data protec-
tion). "The interstate flow of medical information calls for a federal response to these
issues of data protection." Id. at 183.
438. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 138-39 (noting development of health care as
interstate business); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 166 (stating that "[i] n an
age of prevalent interstate data transfers, this lack of uniformity is itself an additional
weakness in American medical data protection."); IITF OPIoNs, supra note 7, at 18
(recognizing emerging consensus that state laws can no longer protect medical data).
439. See IITF OPrIoNs, supra note 7, at 17-18 (describing various self-regulation
attempts by health care sector). For example, the American Health Information Man-
agement Association ("AHIMA") supports legislation protecting the confidentiality of
medical records. Id. at 18; AHIMA 's Role in Health Information Confidentiality Issue (visited
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vide minimal data protection.44 °
e. Direct Marketing
The direct marketing industry is the least regulated sector
even though this subsector deals with large volumes of personal
information.44' New technologies in information processing
have significantly aided direct marketing businesses by improv-
ing how they exchange and process personal data.4 42 The crea-
tion and use of name lists, however, implicate information pri-
vacy concerns.44 For example, direct marketers can predict
consumer behavior by cross-referencing various lists and compil-
ing profiles from personal information.444 Not only does profil-
Feb. 14, 1998) <http://www.ahima.org/media/press.releases/history.html> (also on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (describing AHIMA as association of
35,000 professionals who capture, record, and analyze patient medical data). The Phy-
sician Computer Network, Inc. has developed internal security measures to protect per-
sonal information used in their new software that link physicians to insurance compa-
nies, clinical laboratories, and hospitals. IITF OPrIONS, supra note 7, at 17; Medicine: No
Restrictions on Drug Data, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1994, at A12.
440. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining iarrow scope of self-regula-
tion, lack of enforcement powers, and limited adoption of self-regulation provide only
minimal protection).
441. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 308 (contrasting lack of any
sectoral law targeting direct marketing with sectoral laws in telecommunications and
financial services); IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 25 (describing proliferation of
databases and consumer lists). For instance, the direct marketing industry contributed
about US$75 billion to the gross national product of United States. CAvouKtAN & TAP-
scoTr, supra note 3, at 91.
442. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 24 (describing advantages of new technol-
ogy for direct marketing industry). Extensive databases and new technology such as
caller identification and automatic number identification ("ANI") allow businesses to
compile and store consumer lists, but this, in itself, does not implicate privacy concerns.
Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 517 n.93.
443. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 308-11 (discussing how interna-
tional direct marketing involves processing of detailed demographic information and
intimate personal data); CAVOuKtAN & TAPscoTr, supra note 3, at 90 (noting that faster
computers have allowed direct marketers to develop specific direct marketing tech-
niques). For example, Mandev List Services offer lists that include European subscrib-
ers to Time Magazine, buyers of nightgowns, and women who buy certain beauty prod-
ucts. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 308.
444. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 312-14 (discussing how direct
marketers profile personal data); CAvouKLAN & TAPscoTr, supra note 3, at 55-56 (ex-
plaining how profiles are used). Businesses in direct marketing use Internet trails, trans-
actional data from other purchases or communications, subscriber information, and
public records to compile such profiles. Id. Direct marketers use profiles to create lists
of potential consumers with specific characteristics. Id. at 14. For example, direct mar-
keting catalogs advertise lists of women who wear wigs and of impotent middle-aged
men. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 321-22.
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ing reveal personal information, but it also permits businesses to
limit both the information and offers that an individual re-
ceives.44 5
Despite the threat to informational privacy that direct mar-
keting poses, almost no sectoral laws target direct marketing.446
Direct marketers have no duty to notify consumers of the collec-
tion of marketing data and virtually no law prohibits the secon-
dary use of such data.447 While the Federal Trade Commis-
sion"' ("FTC") has become actively involved in consumer pri-
vacy issues, it has limited itself to educating consumers and
businesses about the use of personal information online449 and
holding workshops to study consumer privacy issues.45 °
The direct marketing industry has tried to compensate for
this lack of formal regulation by setting industry standards.451
The Direct Marketing Association452 ("DMA"), the largest direct
marketing trade association in the United States, has adopted an
445. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 536-17 (explaining that
new information technology can lead to imbalance of political power and manipulation
of citizens).
446. Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 517; see SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 315 (noting that cable television and video rental laws
indirectly limit direct marketing).
447. IITF OPIzoNs, supra note 7, at 25; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8,
at 317 (noting limits only on use of transactional data for cable television and video
rentals).
448. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 614 (describing Federal Trade
Commission as federal agency created in 1914 responsible for "promot[ing] free and
fair competition in interstate commerce through prevention of general trade re-
straints").
449. See IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 26 (describing efforts of Federal Trade
Commission ("HFC") to educate private sector). In 1995, the FTC's Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection began a Consumer Privacy Initiative to educate consumers and busi-
nesses. Id.
450. Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report: Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy
on the Global Information Infrastructure (1996) available on Federal Trade Commission
Home Page, Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure (visited
Oct. 24, 1997) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/privacyl.htm> (also on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). The FTC's Staff Report concluded that workshop
participants agreed upon certain necessary elements of fair information practices on-
line; notice, consumer choice, data security, and consumer access. Id. at 3-4.
451. Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 518; see SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 309 (noting that "industry ardently promotes self-regula-
tion").
452. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 54 n.237. The Direct Marketing Association
("DMA") is a direct marketing trade association composed of approximately 3,500 man-
ufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Id.
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ethical code and set voluntary, self-regulatory standards.453 The
DMA can suspend membership in the organization for violations
of the code and recommends that companies adopt their own
information policies. 45 4 Nonetheless, these industry and busi-
ness policies are permissive4 5  and often are ignored.45 6
Although industry organizations and individual companies seek
to improve data protection, enforcement of these standards will
continue to be difficult because the information is so valuable457
and the standards are voluntary.458
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ASSESSING ADEQUACY OF
DATA PROTECTION
The Directive requires that Member States prevent transfers
of personal data to countries outside the Community that do not
ensure adequate data protection.459 Whether the Directive will
prohibit certain data transfers to the United States depends, in
part, upon what constitutes an adequate level of protection.460
While the Directive notes that adequacy should be assessed in
light of all the circumstances surrounding the transfer, it does
not elaborate upon this standard.461
Which data protection measures will qualify as adequate
453. See id. at 25 (discussing direct marketing efforts at self-regulation). The DMA
has issued "Guidelines for Personal Information Protection" and a Manualfor Fair Infor-
mation Practices. ScHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 309.
454. IITF OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 25. DMA also sponsors services to allow con-
sumers to decrease the amount of unsolicited mail and telemarketing that they receive.
Id.
455. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 316 (explaining that DMA
guidelines permit direct marketers to collect personal data for any "direct marketing
purpose").
456. See id. at 309-10 (citing examples of direct marketing companies ignoring self-
regulation).
457. CAvouKLAN & TAPsco-r, supra note 3, at 96.
458. IITF OPrIONS, supra note 7, at 25; see SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8,
at 338 (noting industry and company codes offer no remedies to individuals).
459. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting
forth standard for transfers to third countries).
460. See id. art. 25(4), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (requiring Member States to
prevent data transfers to third country where Commission finds that third country does
not ensure adequate protection). Whether these transfers will be prevented also de-
pends upon whether the derogations from Article 26 will exempt the transfer in ques-
tion. See id. art. 26, O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (giving exceptions to Article 25).
461. See id. art 25(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting forth factors to be
used to determine whether third country's protection is adequate, but not explaining
how to apply these factors).
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protection has not been established.462 Earlier approaches to
data protection do not explain the Directive's standard of ade-
quacy.46 The Directive itself sets forth the surrounding circum-
stances by which adequacy should be judged, but the Directive
does not explain how these factors should be applied to specific
transfers.4 6 4 To clarify what constitutes an adequate level of pro-
tection, the Article 29 Working Party adopted a discussion docu-
ment analyzing possible ways to assess adequacy.465
A. Adequate Protection Before the Directive
No explanation of adequate protection precedes the Direc-
tive in either earlier data protection measures or prior drafts of
the Directive 4 6 6 Earlier data protection measures establish a
standard of equivalency,4 67 not adequacy.468 Neither the OECD
Guidelines nor the COE Convention indicate what constitutes
adequate protection because neither set forth an adequacy stan-
dard for transfers of data to third countries.469 Likewise, the na-
462. See Gellman, supra note 14, at 157 (relating uncertainty about how Article 25
will be interpreted and applied).
463. See, e.g., COE Convention, supra note 121, art. 12, at 320 (using equivalency
standard); Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24, O.J. C 277/03, at 10 (1990), COM
(90) 314 Final-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990) (proposing adequacy standard be judged by
overall country assessment).
464. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (listing, but
not explaining, surrounding circumstances).
465. See First Orientations, supra note 48 (focusing on central question of assessing
adequacy).
466. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pt. 3, art. 17, at 426 (employing
equivalency standard); COE Convention, supra note 121, art. 12, at 320-21 (adopting
equivalency standard); Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at
474-77 (noting that European national data protection laws use equivalency standard);
Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24, O.J. C 277/03, at 10 (1990), COM (90) 314
Fina-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990) (proposing standard of adequacy that employs overall
country assessment instead of Directive's case-by-case analysis); Amended Proposal,
supra note 145, art. 26, O.J. C 311/04, at 55-56 (1992), COM (92) 422 Fina-SYN 287, at
104-07 (1992) (detailing same adequacy standard as Directive, but providing no expla-
nation); Common Position, supra note 145, art. 25, O.J. L 93/1, at 14 (1995) (setting
forth identical text on transfers to third countries as Directive).
467. See Schwartz, Restrictions on Internal Data Hows, supra note 17, at 473 (identify-
ing equivalency standard with data protection laws that require equivalent level of pro-
tection before data transfer).
468. OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pt. 3, art. 17, at 426 (employing
equivalency standard); COE Convention, supra note 121, art. 12, at 320-21 (adopting
equivalency standard); Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at
474-77 (noting that European national data protection laws use equivalency standard).
469. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 127, pt. 3, arts. 16-18, at 426 (allowing re-
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tional legislation of most European countries establish a stan-
dard of equivalency, not of adequacy.47°
Similarly, prior drafts of the Directive do not clarify Article
25's adequacy standard.471  Although the Original Proposal re-
quired that a third country ensure adequate data protection,472
that initial draft envisaged a more restrictive approach to ade-
quacy than the Directive now contains.4 7 ' The Original Proposal
contemplated blacklisting4 74 countries with inadequate protec-
tion, preventing all transfers to these countries after an overall
country assessment.4 75  Consequently, the Original Proposal's
approach to assessing adequacy does not reflect the Directive's
strictions of data transfers to third countries that do not provide equivalent protection);
COE Convention, supra note 121, art. 12, at 320-21 (permitting restrictions of data
transfers to another signatory party where other party does not provide equivalent pro-
tection). Although the COE Convention did not explicitly discuss data transfers to
third countries, the COE Convention has been interpreted as requiring equivalent pro-
tection of personal data in third countries. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data
Flows, supra note 17, at 478 (explaining that third countries like United States are sub-
ject to COE Convention equivalency standard). The COE Convention, however, does
not mention adequate protection of personal data. See COE Convention, supra note
121, art. 12, at 320-21 (setting forth provisions on transfers of data across national bor-
ders).
470. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data FRows, supra note 17, at 474-77
(examining equivalency standard in European countries such as Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom). For
example, Portugal and Spain explicitly establish an equivalency standard. Id. at 474.
Various other European countries such as Belgium, France, Denmark, and the United
Kingdom have adopted laws that implicitly require equivalent data protection. Id. at
474-75.
471. Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24, OJ. C 277/03, at 10 (1990), COM
(90) 314 Final-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990); Amended Proposal, supra note 145, art. 26,
O.J. C 311/04, at 55-56 (1992), COM (92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 104-07 (1992); Com-
mon Position, supra note 145, art. 25, O.J. L 93/1, at 14 (1995).
472. See Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24(1), O.J. C 277/03, at 10 (1990),
COM (90) 314 Final-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990) (setting forth adequacy standard).
473. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 542-43 (suggesting that
Common Position contains less restrictive provision on third country transfers); Com-
mon Position, supra note 145, art. 25, O.J. L 93/1, at 14 (1995) (setting forth standard
of adequacy eventually included in Directive).
474. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 542 (discussing blacklisting
of third countries with inadequate data protection). Blacklisting a third country in-
volves restricting all data transfers because of inadequate protection. See Reidenberg,
Rules of the Road, supra note 204, at 294 (noting that in contrast to Original Proposal,
Amended Proposal did not provide for blanket restrictions).
475. See Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24, O.J. C 277/01, at 10 (1990),
COM (90) 314 Final-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990) (setting forth adequacy standard that
entailed overall country assessment); Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at
542 (explaining adequacy standard of Original Proposal).
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case-by-case approach.476
Although the Amended Proposal and the Common Position
adopted a case-by-case approach to assessing adequacy, these two
drafts provide no greater explanation of how to assess adequacy
than the Directive.477 The Amended Proposal's provision on ad-
equacy explains what constitutes adequate protection the same
way as the Directive.4 7' The Common Position uses the identical
words as the Directive.479
B. Adequacy According to the Text of the Directive
While the Directive potentially restricts international trade
and may disrupt EU-U.S. relations, Article 25 does not explain
what constitutes an adequate level of protection.48 0 Recognizing
the necessity of data transfers to third countries, Article 25(2)
strives to balance the free flow of information against informa-
tional privacy by assessing adequacy in the context of the circum-
stances surrounding each transfer.411 Although each of these
surrounding circumstances will affect whether a third country af-
fords adequate protection, the Directive only lists these circum-
stances.4 8 2
Commentators recognize several problems with Article
25(2)'s contextual analysis of a third country's data protec-
tion.181 Scholars point out that a case-by-case analysis of all of
476. Compare Original Proposal, supra note 145, art. 24, O.J. C 277/03, at 10
(1990), COM (90) 314 Final-SYN 287, at 65-66 (1990) (setting forth overall country
assessment) with Directive, supra note 4, art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995) (setting
forth case-by-case analysis of data transfers).
477. See Amended Proposal, supra note 145, art. 26(2), O.J. C 311/04, at 55
(1992), COM (92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 106 (1992) (introducing clause requiring ade-
quacy of protection to be assessed in light of circumstances surrounding each data
transfer or set of transfers); Common Position, supra note 145, art. 25(2), O.J. L 93/1,
at 14 (1995) (retaining clause providing for analysis of third countries in light of cir-
cumstances).
478. Compare Amended Proposal, supra note 145, art. 26(2), Oj. C 311/04, at 55
(1992), COM (92) 422 Final-SYN 287, at 106 (1992) with Directive, supra note 4, art.
25(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
479. Compare Common Position, supra note 145, art. 25(2), O.J. L 93/1, at 14
(1995) with Directive, supra note 4, art. 25(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
480. Directive, supra note 4, art. 25, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
481. Id. recitals paras. 56-57, O.J. L 281/31, at 36-37 (1995).
482. See id. art. 25(2), Oj. L 281/31, at 45-46 (listing circumstances by which ade-
quate protection must be assessed, but not explaining how to use these circumstances).
483. See Boehmer & Palmer, supra note 39, at 294 (discussing cumbersome case-by-
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the surrounding circumstances can be cumbersome.48 4 For ex-
ample, if a corporate branch in a Member State wants to transfer
employee records to different branches in the United States,
then this transfer would require a complex analysis of not only
the U.S. federal regulation and the corporation's business prac-
tices,48 5 but also the laws of each state where the branches were
located. 48 6 Another commentator poses a problem with Article
25(2)'s requirement that professional rules be taken into ac-
count.487 Although these business practices, whether industry-
wide or company-specific, contribute significantly to the protec-
tion of personal data, they are rarely either binding or transpar-
ent.488 Thus, business practices are unclear indicators of
whether a third country adequately protects personal data.489
The Article 29 Working Party plays a significant role in de-
termining what constitutes adequate protection.49 ° Under the
Directive, the Working Party's involvement in the decision-mak-
ing process is, however, much less direct than that of the Mem-
ber States, the Commission, or the Article 31 Committee.4 9 ' The
Working Party has no explicit role in making decisions about
particular data transfers.492 The group's work can provide gui-
case analysis); Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at 485-86
(explaining that business practices are difficult data protection measures to assess).
484. Boehmer & Palmer, supra note 39, at 294.
485. See Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at 486 (not-
ing that professional rules mentioned in Article 25(2) include business practices of sin-
gle company or of entire industry).
486. See Boehmer & Palmer, supra note 39, at 294 (noting that assessment of ade-
quacy might be different for each state); Directive, supra, note 4, art. 25(2), O.J. L 281/
31, at 4546 (1995) (requiring analysis of general and sectoral laws as well as profes-
sional rules).
487. Schwartz, Restrictions on International Data Flows, supra note 17, at 485-86.
488. See id. (noting that "companies sometimes refuse to share information regard-
ing their professional standards, which are, moreover, generally subject to unilateral
change.").
489. See id. (explaining that some scholars assert that business practices should not
be considered independently when assessing adequacy).
490. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 30, O.J. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995) (providing
that Working Party must give opinions on level of protection in third countries and
report annually on data protection in third countries).
491. See First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2 (noting that decisions about particu-
lar data transfers are "carried out by the Member States in the first instance, and then
the Commission under the Comitology procedure laid down in Article 31").
492. Compare Directive, supra note 4, art. 30, O.J. L 281/31, at 48-49 (1995) (pro-
viding Working Party with authority to give opinions on level of protection, but not to
make decisions about specific transfers) with id. arts. 25 & 31, O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46,
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dance, nonetheless, on how to assess adequacy in general.49
Further, pursuant to Article 30(1) (b), the Working Party can
submit to the Commission opinions on the adequacy of protec-
tion in third countries after examining some individual cases.49 4
Thus, the Working Party's other work may have greater influ-
ence than mere guidance because the Member States might rec-
ognize that work as an indication of future opinions.
The Working Party's positions on adequacy are influential
because under the Directive, each Member State's supervisory
authority designates representatives to serve as the members of
the Working Party.49 6 Further, these representatives are experts
in the field on data protection.49 v The Working Party's positions
on adequacy may also influence the Member States because the
members of the Working Party formulate these positions as the
representatives of the Member States.4 98
C. Article 29 Working Party's Approach to Assessing Adequacy
InJune 1997, the Article 29 Working Party adopted a discus-
sion document examining possible ways to assess adequacy of
third country data protection.499 The document, First Orienta-
tions on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries - Possible
Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy 500 ("First Orientations"),
49 (setting forth roles of Member States, Commission, and Article 31 Committee with
regard to determining whether third country's data protection is adequate).
493. See First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2 (explaining that Working Party's
work is "intended to provide guidance regarding a broad mass of cases").
494. Directive, supra note 4, art. 30(1) (b), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995); First Orien-
tations, supra note 48, at 2-3.
495. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 30(1) (b), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (setting
forth Working Party's power to give opinions on adequacy of protection in third coun-
tries).
496. See id. art. 29(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (describing composition of Arti-
cle 29 Working Party).
497. See First Annual Report, supra note 225, at 22-25 (listing representatives of
Working Party and their positions in national supervisory authorities).
498. See Directive, supra note 4, at 29(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (stating that
representatives of Member State supervisory authorities shall compose Working Party).
Even if a Member State's Working Party representative disagrees with the majority of
the Working Party, the Member State is likely to follow the Working Party's position on
adequacy, as this position constitutes the position of the majority of the national super-
visory authorities. See id. art. 29(2) & (3), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995) (noting that
Working Party makes decisions by majority of representatives of supervisory authori-
ties).
499. First Orientations, supra note 48.
500. Id.
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functions as a white paper,50 1 presenting the evolving doctrine of
the Working Party.5 ° 2 This paper is significant, nonetheless, be-
cause the Working Party suggests an approach to assessing the
level of protection afforded by third countries. 5°3 The group
suggests that adequacy should be assessed on a case-by-case basis,
evaluating both the content of the third country's data protec-
tion rules and that country's procedural mechanisms for ensur-
ing that the rules are effective.5 °4
1. Procedure to Assess Adequacy
In the first section of the Working Party's First Orientations,
the Working Party outlines a procedural approach to assessing
adequacy. °5 Here, the Working Party recognizes that Article 25
establishes a case-by-case approach for assessing the adequacy of
a data transfer or a set of transfers.5°6 The Working Party also
acknowledges that Member States are not capable of making an
individual detailed analysis of every transfer of personal data to
third countries. 50 7 The paper suggests, therefore, that Member
States develop a decision-making procedure by which they can
501. See Europa, Official Documents - White Papers (visited Feb. 15, 1998) <http://
europa.eu.int/search97cgi/s97rcgi ... =white paper& ViewTemplate=EUROPA. view.
hts> (also on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) (explaining that "[a] White
Paper is a document presenting detailed and debated policy both for discussion and
political decision."); cf Europa, Official Documents - Green Papers (visited Feb. 15, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/green/index.htm> (also on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal) (explaining that "[a] Green Paper is a document presented for
public discussion and debate.").
502. See First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2 (implying that Working Party in-
tended First Orientations to provide guidance to Member States and Commission).
Although the Working Party does have de jure authority to "make recommendations on
all matters relating to the protection of persons regarding to the processing of personal
data in the Community," the Directive does not explicitly authorize the group to issue
recommendations on the adequacy of protection in third countries. Directive, supra
note 4, art. 30(3), O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995). The Working Party does, however, have
defacto authority to make such recommendations. See First Orientations, supra note 48,
at 2-3 (noting that Working Party can give provisional views on adequacy of protection
regarding particular data transfers).
503. See First Orientations, supra note 48, at I (focusing on adequacy in the con-
text of Article 25(1) & (2), not in the sense used in Article 26(2) exemptions).
504. See id. at 4 (discussing what constitutes adequate protection).
505. See id. at 1-4 (describing procedural approach to assessing adequacy).
506. Id. at 1.
507. See id. at 1-2 (stating that "given the huge number of transfers of personal
data leaving the Community on a daily basis and the multitude of actors involved in
such transfers, no Member State, whatever the system it chooses to implement Article
25, will be able to ensure that each and every case is examined in detail.").
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examine some cases in detail, but permit most transfers.5 °s
The Working Party suggests that Member States could de-
velop provisional white lists50 9 to create categories of data trans-
fers that need not be examined individually. 510 Although the
Original Proposal provided for blacklisting third countries with
inadequate protection,5 the Working Party abandons this ap-
proach.512 Instead, Member States could develop white lists of
countries that ensure an adequate level of protection. 13 Under
Article 25's case-by-case approach, Member States would need to
base their white lists on several representative cases rather than
an abstract analysis of the law.514
While the Working Party favors white listing, the group ac-
knowledges two difficulties with this approach to assessing ade-quacy. 515 The Working Party recognizes that Member States can-
not automatically white list all transfers to a third country that
does not have uniform data protection.5 6 Instead, Member
States must determine whether the various laws and business
practices of the third country provide adequate protection in
certain sectors and white list those sectors.5 1 7
508. See id. at 2 (discussing need for procedural mechanism for assessing ade-
quacy).
509. See id. at 2 (noting that white list of third countries would consist of countries
deemed to provide adequate protection).
510. See id. at 2-3 (discussing white lists).
511. See Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 53, at 543 (noting that Original
Proposal contemplated blacklisting).
512. See First Orientations, supra note 48, at 3 (rejecting blacklisting). The Work-
ing Party explains that even if a third country is not white-listed, Member States should
not infer that the third country is black-listed, but instead "that no guidance regarding
that particular country is yet available." Id. The group recognizes that black-listing
countries would be politically sensitive. Id.
513. Id. at 2 (discussing how to develop white lists).
514. Id. Recall that Article 25(2) requires that adequacy be assessed in the context
of the circumstances surrounding a data transfer. Directive, supra note 5, art. 25(2),
O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995). Article 25(3) requires that Member States and the Com-
mission notify one another of cases where a third country does not provide adequate
protection within the meaning of Article 25(2). Id. In the context of the emphasis that
these two provisions place upon analyzing particular "transfers or sets of transfers," the
Working Party seeks to maintain the case-by-case analysis. See First Orientations, supra
note 48, at 1-4 (outlining case-by-case procedure for assessing adequacy).
515. First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2-3.
516. See id. at 2 (presenting problem of assessing adequacy of third countries that
lack uniform data protection). For example, a Member State should not white list all
transfers to a third country that protects personal information in some, but not all,
sectors. Id.
517. See id. at 2 (noting that "care would need to be taken in deciding whether the
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Further, the Working Party also recognizes that the Direc-
tive involves various parties in assessing adequacy of third coun-
tries.518 The paper explains the complementary roles of the
Member States, the Commission, and the Working Party in as-
sessing adequacy.519 The Member States ordinarily should make
a preliminary decision about whether protection is adequate for
a particular transfer.5 20 Then the Commission, working with the
Article 31 Committee, must decide whether transfers to the third
country should be prevented or permitted. 21 The Working
Party has no role in determining adequacy in particular cases,
but it can give formal opinions on the level of protection in third
countries and provide informal guidance on how to assess ade-
quacy in general.5 2
Next, the Working Party explains the second step of its rec-
ommended procedure.523 These experts recognize that Member
States will need to examine specific data transfers to third coun-
tries that are not white listed with regard to that type of trans-
fer.524 The manner in which the Member States analyze these
non-white listed transfers will depend upon whether controllers
or Member States' supervisory authorities are responsible for as-
sessing adequacy.525 If controllers assess adequacy, then they
should be able to handle the limited data transfers that they
protection afforded to a particular data transfer was representative of the entire country
or only of a particular sector or state"). For instance, a Member State examining the
United States would have to examine the U.S. Constitution, federal and state law, and
business practices, to assess whether any U.S. sector protected data adequately. See id.
(recognizing added difficulty to third countries with federal systems).
518. See id. at 2 (describing roles of Member States, Commission, Article 31 Com-
mittee, and Working Party in assessing adequacy of third country data protection).
519. Id.
520. See id. (noting that Member States make decisions about particular data trans-
fers). But see Directive, supra note 4, art. 25(3), O.J. L 281/31, at 46 (1995) (providing
Commission with authority to make decisions on particular transfers also).
521. First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2; Directive, supra note 4, arts. 25(4),
25(6), 31(2), OJ. L 281/31, at 46, 49 (1995).
522. First Orientations, supra note 48, at 2-3; Directive, supra note 4, art. 30(1) (b),
O.J. L 281/31, at 48 (1995).
523. First Orientations, supra note 48, at 3-4.
524. Id. at 3. The third countries may be either not white listed at all or partially
white listed, but not in the sector of the particular transfer in question. See id. at 2
(describing possibility of partial white listing).
525. Id. at 3. A footnote in the Working Party's paper explains that a Member
State may impose the duty to assess adequacy on the data controllers and/or the super-
visory authorities. See id. at 1 n.1 (explaining that Member States can establish different
administrative procedures under Article 25).
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make.52 6 In contrast, if the Member State assigns the duty to
assess adequacy to its supervisory authority, then this authority
will be responsible for a large volume of transfers.527 Because
these transfers may be so numerous, the Working Party suggests
that the authorities prioritize these non-white listed transfers. 28
After identifying the transfers that pose the most serious threats
to data privacy, the national authorities could examine these
transfers first.5 29 Identifying such transfers will also help the au-
thorities assess what measures are necessary to protect personal
data against these risks to privacy.53 °
The Working Party outlines a provisional list of data transfer
categories that pose particular risks to individual privacy.531 For
instance, the first category of transfers that the paper identifies
526. See id. at 3 (implying that compared to huge volume of transfers to be as-
sessed by supervisory authorities, transfers to be assessed by controllers will be managea-
ble).
527. Id. The Working Party suggests that the Member States might assign the duty
to assess adequacy to the supervisory authorities in one of two ways. Id. at 1 n.1. An
authority could authorize data transfers before they take place or verify them ex post
facto. Id.
528. Id. at 3.
529. Id. Under this system of prioritization, national supervisory authorities would
still be responsible for requiring that all transfers receive adequate protection. Id. The
supervisory authorities, however, could focus most of their attention and resources on
the priority cases. Id.
530. Id.
531. See id. at 3-4 (stating that Working Party will issue more specific and detailed
paper discussing risky transfer categories). This list of data transfers posing a particular
threat to privacy includes:
- those transfers involving certain sensitive categories of data as defined by
Article 8 of the directive;
- transfers which carry the risk of financial loss (e.g. credit card payments
over the Internet);
- transfers carrying a risk to personal safety;
- transfers made for the purposes of making a decision which significantly
affects the individual (such as recruitment or promotion decisions, the
granting of credit, etc.);
- transfers which carry a risk of serious embarrassment or tarnishing of an
individual's reputation;
- transfers which may result in specific actions which constitute a significant
intrusion into an individual's private life, such as unsolicited telephone
calls;
- repetitive transfers involving massive volumes of data (such as transactional
data processing over telecommunications networks, the Internet etc.);
- transfers involving the collection of data in a particularly covert or clandes-
tine manner (e.g. Internet cookies).
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are those that involve sensitive personal data.5 32 Such sensitive
information includes an individual's race, religion, ethnicity,
political opinions, and medical records.533 Another category in-
volves transfers that may result in intrusions into an individual's
private life. 534 For example, some direct marketing techniques
might constitute such an intrusion.535
2. Standard to Assess Adequacy
After presenting a procedure by which Member States can
assess adequacy, the Working Party describes the minimum re-
quirements for adequate protection.53 6 The Working Party con-
cludes that an analysis of adequate protection must examine the
two basic elements of adequate protection.53 7  These two ele-
ments are the content of the applicable rules and the means of
enforcing these rules.53 ' Drawing upon the rights and obliga-
tions set down in the Directive, the Working Party identifies six
basic content principles that ensure adequate data protection. 9
The group also recognizes that to be effective data protection
principles must be followed in practice. 540 Thus, a third country
must have enforcement mechanisms 54 1 to guarantee compliance
with the content principles. 542
532. Id. at 3.
533. See Directive, supra note 4, art. 8(1), O.J. L 281/31, at 40 (1995) (listing spe-
cial categories of personal data to which Working Party refers in first category).
534. First Orientations, supra note 48, at 4.
535. See id. (noting unsolicited phone calls as possible intrusion).
536. See id. at 4-7 (explaining what constitutes adequate protection). The Working
Party recognizes that these minimum requirements must not be too rigid. Id. at 5. The
group suggests that the list of requirements might be supplemented or reduced where
necessary. Id.
537. Id. at 5.
538. Id.
539. See id. at 5-6 (listing content principles as (1) purpose limitation principle, (2)
data quality and proportionality principle, (3) transparency principle, (4) security prin-
ciple, (5) rights of access, rectification, and opposition, and (6) restrictions on onward
transfer to other third countries). To derive these principles, the Working Party took
into account the provisions of the other data protection texts such as the COE Conven-
tion and the OECD Guidelines. See id. at 4-5 (describing elements of earlier data protec-
tion measures).
540. Id. at 4.
541. See id. (giving sanctions, remedies, liabilities, supervisory authorities, and noti-
fication as examples of procedural enforcement mechanisms).
542. Id. The Working Party cites the enforcement mechanisms included in Euro-
pean data protection laws and the EC Directive. Id. The group, however, acknowledges
that third countries often do not have extensive enforcement mechanisms. Id.
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The basic content principles for adequate protection reflect
the standards of the Directive. 54 3 According to the Working
Party, data protection measures in a third country should re-
quire that controllers process personal information for a specific
purpose and not reuse that data for an incompatible purpose. 44
Personal information should be accurate and, where necessary,
kept up to date as well as adequate, relevant, and not exces-
sive.54 Further, the controller should inform data subjects of
the purpose for the processing, the controller's identity, and any
other information necessary to ensure fairness. 46 In addition,
the controller should implement appropriate technical and or-
ganizational security measures to protect the personal data.547
The third country's data protection measures should also pro-
vide the data subject with a right to access personal data, a right
to correct inaccurate data, and a right to object to processing of
the data.548 Finally, the Working Party concludes that the third
country should allow further transfers of the data to another
third country only if the other third country provides adequate
data protection. 49
In addition to the six basic content principles, the Working
Party suggests that certain types of transfers might be subject to
additional requirements. 550 For example, a transfer of sensitive
data should receive additional safeguards, such as a requirement
that the data subject explicitly consent to the transfer. 55 ' Fur-
ther, before a transfer of personal data for direct marketing pur-
poses, the controller should permit the data subject to opt-out of
543. Id. at 4-5. The content principles also reflect the general "consensus as to the
content of data protection rules which stretches well beyond the fifteen states of the
Community." Id. at 4.
544. See id. at 5 (describing purpose limitation principle derived from Directive,
art. 6(1) (b) as first content principle).
545. See id. (stating data quality and proportionality principle derived from Direc-
tive, art. 6(1)(c) & (d) as second content principle).
546. See id. at 5 (describing transparency principle derived from Directive, art. 10
as third content principle).
547. See id. (stating security principle derived from Directive, art. 17 as fourth con-
tent principle).
548. See id. (describing principle securing rights of access, rectification, and oppo-
sition derived from Directive, arts. 12(a), 12(b), and 14 as fifth content principle).
549. See id. at 5-6 (stating principle regarding restrictions on onward transfers to
other third countries as sixth content principle).
550. See id. (explaining that in some instances, transfers will need to meet addi-
tional requirements).
551. Id. at 6.
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the transfer.552
The Working Party proceeds to discuss what enforcement
mechanisms are necessary for data protection measures to con-
stitute adequate protection.55 The Working Party acknowledges
that to provide adequate protection a third country needs some
mechanism to ensure compliance with the content principles. 4
Although most Member States favor omnibus data protection
laws enforced by independent supervisory authorities, the Work-
ing Party does not require third countries to adopt such an ap-
proach.555 Instead, the Working Party identifies three essential
objectives of an enforcement system.556 The third country's pro-
cedural framework must deliver a good level of compliance with
the data protection rules..5 7 The enforcement system should
help individual data subjects enforce their rights. 558 Finally, the
third country's procedural system should provide the data sub-
ject with a method to obtain appropriate redress.559
III. PARTIAL ADEQUACY OF U.S. DATA PROTECTION
ASSESSED UNDER THE WORKING PARTYS
APPROACH
The Member States and the Commission should conclude
that U.S. protection ensures adequate protection in some con-
texts, but not in others. The United States provides adequate
protection in the public sector, but not in the private sector as a
whole. Nonetheless, Member States and the Commission should
552. Id. The Working Party notes that transfers involving automated individual
decisions might also involve additional requirements. Id.
553. See id. at 6-7 (discussing requirements for enforcement mechanism of content
principles).
554. See id. at 4 (concluding that enforcement mechanism is essential to data pro-
tection).
555. See id. at 6 (recognizing that requiring third country to adopt omnibus laws
would be too formalistic).
556. Id. at 6-7.
557. Id. at 6. The procedural system need not ensure total compliance, but it
should generate controllers and data subjects aware of their roles in the system. Id.
Further, other enforcement mechanisms like sanctions and direct verification of trans-
fers are valuable. Id. at 6-7.
558. Id. at 7. The individual should be able to enforce his rights rapidly and effec-
tively, without prohibitive cost, through an independent investigative mechanism. Id.
559. Id. The Working Party notes that a system of independent arbitration with
compensation and sanctions is necessary. Id.
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white list56 ° transfers in the context of specific areas of the pri-
vate sector such as telecommunications and credit reporting.
U.S. data protection in other subsectors such as banking and em-
ployment may also provide adequate protection if the self-regu-
lation that they adopt is demand effective. In some specific areas
of the private sector, however, neither formal legislation nor ef-
fective self-regulation exists, so protection in these areas is cer-
tainly inadequate.
A. Member States and the Commission Should Analyze U.S. Data
Protection by Sector
Article 25 of the Directive provides that the Member States
and the Commission should assess U.S. data protection on a
case-by-case basis.56 ' Only by examining a particular transfer or
set of transfers can the Member States determine whether the
United States has an adequate level of protection in light of all
the circumstances.562 Although the Working Party acknowl-
edged that Article 25 provides for a case-by-case approach, the
Working Party recognizes that Member States could not ex-
amine every data transfer to a third country like the United
States.5 63 Consequently, the Working Party suggests that the
Member States and the Commission develop provisional white
lists of countries that provide adequate protection.564 The Work-
ing Party also recognizes that where many third countries do not
have omnibus data protection, Member States and the Commis-
sion should not assess data protection overall. 65 instead, the
Member States should white list those sectors that do ensure ade-
quate protection, but not those that fail to do SO. 5 6 6 If a third
country does not provide adequate protection in a particular sec-
560. See supra note 509 (discussing white listing).
561. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that procedure for assess-
ing level of data protection in third countries involves case-by-case analysis).
562. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 25(2) re-
quires Member States to assess third countries adequacy in light of surrounding circum-
stances).
563. See supra note 507 and accompanying text (relating Working Party's recogni-
tion that detailed analysis of every transfer is impossible).
564. See supra note 510 and accompanying text (discussing provisional white lists).
565. See supra note 516 and accompanying text (stating Working Party's position
that Member States should not white list all transfers where third country's data protec-
tion laws are not uniform).
566. See supra note 517 and accompanying text (explaining partial white listing).
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tor, then the Member States should analyze specific transfers,
giving priority to those that pose particular threats to privacy.567
When assessing the level of U.S. data protection under the
Working Party's suggested procedure, the Member States should
analyze data transfers to the U.S. that are representative of par-
ticular sectors, not of the entire country. Because the United
States approaches data protection in an ad hoc, sectoral manner,
Member States should not judge the adequacy of U.S. protection
as a whole. Member States should instead assess the level of data
protection that the United States provides in different sectors
and white list those sectors that provide adequate protection. 56
The U.S. public and private sectors should be examined sepa-
rately because U.S. data protection laws regulate the government
and private citizens differently.569 Member States should analyze
the adequacy of data protection in the U.S.. public sector as a
unit because federal regulation of the public sector generally ap-
plies to the entire public sector.57 °
In contrast, Member States should assess adequacy in the
U.S. private sector by particular subsectors such as telecommuni-
cations and direct marketing. This specific analysis is necessary
because U.S. data protection in the private sector generally
targets particular areas.5 7 ' Federal and state laws regulating the
private sector apply in specific contexts. 572 Further, self-regula-
tion of the private sector has been adopted in specific industries
or by particular companies rather than by the entire public sec-
tor.
573
Finally, Member States should analyze individual data trans-
fers to those U.S. sectors or subsectors that are not white listed.
The Member States will need to give priority to those transfers to
567. See supra notes 523-33 and accompanying text (relating Working Party's spe-
cific analysis of transfers in sectors without adequate protection).
568. See supra note 517 and accompanying text (discussing partial white listing).
569. See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text (relating different regulation of
private and public sectors in United States).
570. See supra notes 286-322 and accompanying text (discussing federal statutes
that regulate entire public sector).
571. See supra note 343 and accompanying text (noting sectoral regulation of pri-
vate sector).
572. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (stating that federal statutes in pri-
vate in private sector target particular areas).
573. See supra note 345 and accompanying text (relating narrowly targeted self-
regulation in private sector).
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the United States that pose particular threats to privacy. 74
Member States should determine which specific transfers de-
serve priority by ascertaining whether the specific transfers fall
into one of the categories of transfers that pose a risk to individ-
ual privacy.575
B. US Data Protection in the Public Sector Is Adequate
The Member States should find that U.S. data protection in
the public sector ensures an adequate level of protection be-
cause regulation of the U.S. public sector complies with the
Working Party's minimum requirements for adequate protec-
tion. U.S. data protection in the public sector embodies most of
the content principles outlined by the Working Party.576 Fur-
ther, this data protection provides enforcement mechanisms
that satisfy the objectives set forth by the Working Party.5 77
1. U.S. Data Protection in the Public Sector Reflects the
Content Principles
U.S. regulation of the public sector reflects most of the con-
tent principles suggested by the Working Party and derived from
the Directive.5 7 ' Data protection laws in the U.S. public sector
reflect the purpose limitation principle, which requires control-
lers to process data for a specific purpose and to reuse such data
only for a compatible purpose.5 79 For instance, under the Pri-
vacy Act, 58 ° a federal agency can maintain only personal data
necessary and relevant to accomplish the agency's purpose.5 '
The Privacy Act also prohibits disclosure of personal data unless
disclosure is compatible with the purpose for which the govern-
574. See supra notes 528-30 and accompanying text (explaining need to prioritize
transfers that do not fall into white-listed sector).
575. See supra notes 531-35 and accompanying text (discussing categories of partic-
ularly risky transfers outlined by Working Party).
576. See supra notes 543-49 and accompanying text (describing six basic content
principles).
577. See supra notes 553-59 and accompanying text (relating three essential objec-
tives of enforcement system).
578. See supra notes 267-340 (discussing U.S. regulation of public sector at constitu-
tional, federal, and state level).
579. See supra note 544 and accompanying text (relating purpose limitation princi-
ple).
580. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
581. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
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ment collected the data.58 2 Further, specific laws regulate when
the U.S. Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service can
disclose personal data.583
U.S. data protection regulation in the public sector em-
braces other content principles. The Privacy Act protects data
quality584 by requiring that federal agencies maintain relevant,
accurate, timely, and complete records.5 85 :In addition, the Pri-
vacy Act encourages transparency 86 by requiring federal agen-
cies to publish lists of the personal data that they maintain. 587
U.S. laws like the Privacy Act also oblige federal agencies take
measures to ensure security588 and confidentiality of personal
data. 589 Finally, the Privacy Act guarantees most data subjects
the right to access and correct 590 personal information. 591
U.S. regulation of the public sector, however, does not em-
body the Working Party's content principles in two respects.
The right to access and correct personal data under the Privacy
Act applies only to citizens and legal residents of the United
States, not EU citizens.592 U.S. data protection law also makes'no
provision for further transfers to non-EU countries. 593
Despite these two deficiencies, the Member States should
conclude that U.S. data protection in the public sector satisfies
the content principles set forth by the Working Party. Although
the Workihg Party suggests six content principles, it recognizes
that this list might need to be supplemented or reduced.5 9 4 In
the public sector, U.S. data protection reflects a significant por-
582. Id. § 552a(a)(7) & (b)(3).
583. See supra notes 323-27 and accompanying text (discussing federal statutes that
regulate public sector in specific contexts).
584. See supra note 545 and accompanying text (stating data quality and propor-
tionality principle):
585. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (5).
586. See supra note 546 and accompanying text (relating transparency principle).
587. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) (1994).
588. See supra note 547 and accompanying text (describing security principle).
589. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (noting Privacy Act requires certain
safeguards).
590. See supra note 548 and accompanying text (stating principle securing right to
access and correct personal data).
591. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text (relating right of access under
Privacy Act).
592. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (2).
593. See supra note 549 and accompanying text (stating principle that requires re-
strictions on further transfers of personal data to non-EC countries).
594. See supra note 536 (noting that list of content principles in not rigid).
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tion of the content principles. At present, Member States and
the Community should excuse the limited scope of the Privacy
Act because Congress enacted this statute long before the Direc-
tive required third countries to provide adequate protection.
Perhaps the Community should urge the United States to ex-
pand the scope of the Privacy Act at some later point, but the
Privacy Act's present failure to cover non-U.S. citizens should be
excused.
Similarly, Member States should excuse the failure of U.S.
data protection to restrict further data transfers to third coun-
tries without adequate protection. The restriction of data trans-
fers to non-EU countries without adequate protection is a new
data protection principle that the Directive itself introduced.595
In fact, the United States can hardly be expected to restrict on-
ward transfers to third countries without adequate ,data protec-
tion when the Working Party is still explaining what constitutes
adequate protection. Thus, Member States should recognize
that U.S. data protection in the public sector embodies a sub-
stantial portion of the Working Party's content principles.
2. U.S. Data Protection in the Public Sector Provides Effective
Mechanisms for Enforcing the Content Principles
U.S. regulation of personal data in the public sector ensures
effective application of the content principles through proce-
dural and enforcement mechanisms. Although the United
States can certainly improve enforcement of data protection reg-
ulation in the public sector, 9 6 such data protection satisfies the
three objectives established by the Working Party.597 Conse-
quently, Member States should conclude that data protection in
the U.S. public sector complies with the enforcement require-
ments set forth in the Working Party's First Orientations.
U.S. data protection in the public sector satisfies the Work-
ing Party's three enforcement objectives.59 ' For example, U.S.
statutes deliver a good level of compliance with the content prin-
595. See supra notes 466-76 (noting that no earlier data protection measures used
adequacy standard).
596. See supra notes 334-40 and accompanying text (discussing deficiencies of data
protection in U.S. public sector).
597. See supra notes 553-59 (explaining three essential enforcement objectives).
598. See supra notes 286-340 (explaining enforcement of ,various federal statutes
that regulate U.S. public sector).
1998] 1011
1012 FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:932
ciples.599 The Privacy Act requires each federal agency to pub-
lish a list of its records60 ° and provides data subjects with the
right to sue for violating the statute.60 1 The Matching Act6 02 im-
proves compliance by establishing procedures to regulate data
matching and by creating the Data Integrity Boards to regulate
federal agency data matching.60" While the Privacy Act and the
Matching Act do not enable data subjects to enjoin federal agen-
cies to change their practices,60 4 the Working Party recognizes
that perfect compliance is impossible.605
Further, the U.S. system allows individual data subjects to
exercise their rights and obtain redress in the courts. 606
Although enforcement of U.S. data privacy statutes is often diffi-
cult,60 7 the Privacy Act does permit individuals to sue to enforce
their rights. 608 The Privacy Act also provides redress for data
subjects. An individual can appeal when a federal agency denies
a request to amend incorrect personal information.6"9 Further,
an individual can sue the federal agency for Privacy Act viola-
tions.6 10 A government employee may even be found criminally
liable for knowingly and willfully violating the Privacy Act.6 11
Member States should conclude that U.S. data protection in
the public sector is adequate because U.S. regulation provides
effective enforcement of the content principles. Admittedly, the
U.S. system has no independent authority to enforce data pro-
tection rules and enforcement is often slow and costly. Nonethe-
599. See supra note 557 and accompanying text (noting that one objective of en-
forcement system must be to ensure good level of compliance).
600. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (4) (1994).
601. Id. § 552a(d)(3) & (g).
602. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552a(a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
603. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of
Matching Act).
604. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (noting limited injunctive power of
Privacy Act).
605. See supra note 555 and accompanying text (relating flexibility of Working
Party's approach).
606. See supra notes 558-59 (stating that two objectives of enforcement system must
be to help individuals enforce their right and to provide appropriate redress).
607. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties with enforc-
ing Privacy Act).
608. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (3) & (g) (1994).
609. Id. § 552a(f).
610. Id. § 552a(d)(3) & (g).
611. Id. § 552a(i).
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less, the Working Party recognizes that third country data protec-
tion measures need not be identical to Member State data pro-
tection measures.612 Consequently, because the U.S. laws
embody most of the content principles and provide mechanisms
to enforce these principles, Member States should find that the
United States ensures an adequate level of protection for data
transfers in the public sector.
C. U.S. Data Protection in the Private Sector Is Generally Inadequate,
But Data Protection in Particular Areas of the Private
Sector Is Adequate
The Member States should conclude that U.S. data protec-
tion in the private sector does not provide an adequate level of
protection in general. Specific subsectors such as telecommuni-
cations and the credit reporting industry, however, should be
white listed. Further, the Member States may also white list
other specific areas of the U.S. private sector, such as, employ-
ment and banking after determining that those sectors provide
adequate self-regulation. Moreover, those areas in the U.S. pri-
vate sector that do not ensure adequate protection such as
health care and direct marketing should not be blacklisted. In-
stead, Member States should analyze such data transfers on a
case-by-case basis, giving priority to transfers that pose a particu-
lar risk to privacy.
1. U.S. Data Protection in the. Private Sector Is Inadequate on
the Whole
The Member States should not white list all data transfers to
the U.S. private sector because data protection in the private sec-
tor as a whole fails to reflect the Working Party's minimum re-
quirements for adequate protection. Under the ad hoc, sectoral
approach, U.S. regulation of the private sector is not uniform.6 1
Because there are no comprehensive data protection measures
in the private sector, significant gaps in data protection exist.
For example, while a federal statute protects video rental
612. See supra note 555 and accompanying text (noting that Working Party's ap-
proach to enforcement mechanism is not too formal).
613. See supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text (discussing sectoral nature of
U.S. data protection in private sector).
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records,6 1 4 medical records are basically unregulated at the fed-
eral level.615 Further, self-regulation does not solve this problem
because businesses and industries have not uniformly adopted
self-regulation.616 Consequently, due to the patchwork of data
protection regulation in the private sector, Member States
should not find that the entire private sector provides adequate
protection.
2. U.S. Data Protection in Certain Areas such as
Telecommunications and Credit Reporting Is
Adequate
Although Member States should not white list the entire pri-
vate sector, particular areas of the private sector do ensure ade-
quate protection. For example, the credit reporting industry
and a significant portion of the telecommunications sector sat-
isfy most of the Working Party's requirements. Regulation of
both credit reporting and telecommunications embody the con-
tent principles. Data protection in these two areas also provides
sufficient enforcement. Finally, self-regulation in both sectors
supplements any deficiencies in legislation. 61 7
Members States should white list most data transfers to the
United States in the field of telecommunications. U.S. statutes
regarding telecommunications embody many of the Working
Party's content principles. 618 The ECPA 19 and the Telecommu-
nications Act6 20 reflect the purpose specification principle and
the data quality principle by regulating the collection, mainte-
nance, and disclosure of personal data.6 ' Security of telecom-
munications data is ensured by the ECPA as well as by self-regula-
614. See supra note 53 (noting Video Privacy Protection Act's regulation of video
rental records).
615. See supra notes 427-40 and accompanying text (discussing lack of U.S. data
protection regarding medical records).
616. Compare supra notes 374-81 (describing significant self-regulation of telecom-
munications) with supra notes 451-458 (describing poor self-regulation of direct market-
ing).
617. See supra note 485 (noting that self-regulation by company or industry quali-
fies as professional rules under Directive's adequacy standards).
618. See supra notes 543-49 (describing Working Party's content principles).
619. The Electronic Communications Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511,
2701-2709 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2511, 2701-2709 (West Supp. 1997).
620. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 222 (West Supp. 1997).
621. See supra notes 356, 370-70 and accompanying text (relating data protection
of ECPA and Telecommunications Act).
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tion.62 Further, the ECPA ensures a good level of compliance
and provides redress for individuals.6 23 The Telecommunica-
tions Act does not cover non-telecommunications carriers, how-
ever, so data transfers to non-telecommunications carriers might
not have adequate protection.624
Likewise, regulation of the credit reporting industry reflects
the Working Party's content principles. The FCRA625 regulates
the collection and subsequent use of credit information 626 and
protects data quality by ensuring that data is complete and accu-
rate.6 27 The .statute also guarantees a right to access and correct
credit information.628 In addition to the FCRA, the credit re-
porting industry has adopted voluntary privacy standards to pro-
tect personal data.6 29 Moreover, the FCRA provides substantial
enforcement mechanisms.63 °
U.S. data protection in telecommunications and credit re-
porting should be considered adequate. Although regulation of
these sectors does not meet all of the content principles, this
regulation does satisfy most of them. Further, regulation of tele-
communications and credit reporting provides some enforce-
ment measures. Thus, if Member States decide to white list any
areas of the U.S. private sector, they should at least white list
transfers in the context of telecommunications and credit re-
porting.
3. U.S. Data Protection in Other Specific Areas such as
Banking and Employment May Be Considered
Adequate
While legislation in some specific areas of the private sector
622. See supra notes 360, 380 and accompanying text (discussing security of tele-
communications).
623. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (noting enforcement of ECPA).
624. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (mentioning limited scope of Tele-
communications Act).
625. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), amended by 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u (West Supp. 1998).
626. See supra notes 393-394 and accompanying text (noting data protection of
FRCA).
627. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1681c-k.
628. Id. § 1681m.
629. See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text (discussing self-regulation of
credit reporting industry).
630. See supra notes 397-98 and accompanying text (explaining enforcement of
FCRA through private law suits and FTC oversight).
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does not constitute adequate protection, significant self-regula-
tion in those industries may provide adequate protection. No
comprehensive data protection laws regulate either banking 631
or the workplace. 2 Both of these areas of the private sector,
however, engage in significant self-regulation. The financial
services industry has traditionally protected customer informa-
tion and recently has adopted data protection policies. 633 Simi-
larly, in addition to complying with a few narrow statutes that
protect employee information, many employers have instituted
fair information practices.634
Member States should place specific areas of the U.S. pri-
vate sector that have adopted substantial self-regulation on provi-
sional white lists if this self-regulation is comprehensive and en-
sures enforcement of the Working Party's content principles. If
self-regulation targets only a portion of the companies in a spe-
cific industry, however, then that industry's protection does not
provide adequate protection. Further, even if self-regulation in
a specific area is comprehensive, Member States should white list
that area only if the statutory regulation and the self-regulation
reflect the Working Party's six content principles and ensure
their enforcement. 635
4. U.S. Data Protection in Many Areas of the Private Sector
such as Health Care and Direct Marketing Are Not Adequate
Member States should not white list many areas of the U.S.
private sector. For instance, data protection in health care and
direct marketing is inadequate. No federal legislation regulates
the treatment of medical records, and state laws and the health
care industry provide meager protection of personal medical in-
formation. 63 16 Likewise, almost no sectoral laws regulate direct
631. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text (noting lack of comprehensive
privacy legislation regulating banking).
632. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (relating patchwork regulation of
employee information).
633. See supra notes 383-87 and accompanying text (discussing self-regulation of
banking industry).
634. See supra notes 421-26 and accompanying text (describing self-regulation by
employers).
635. See supra note 538 and accompanying text (explaining Working Party's sug-
gested minimum requirements for adequate protection).
636. See supra notes 435-40 and accompanying text (describing minimal federal
and state regulation of medical records).
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marketing and industry efforts are generally ineffectual.63 7
Thus, these two specific areas, like many other areas in the pri-
vate sector, do not provide an adequate level of protection for
data transferred to the United States.
While the Member States should not partially white list spe-
cific areas that lack adequate protection, the Member States also
should not blacklist these areas. The Working Party suggests
that instead the Member States should analyze specific transfers
in these areas that are not white listed.6" 8 Under this approach,
the Member States will need to give priority to transfers that
pose particular risks to privacy. 639 Specific transfers in the con-
text of both health care and direct marketing should probably
be given priority because they would likely fall under the catego-
ries of particularly risky transfers outlined by the Working Party.
For example, transfers of medical data to the United States
should receive priority because such transfers involve sensitive
data as identified in Article 8 of the Directive. 64" Likewise, trans-
fers in the context of direct marketing pose a threat to privacy
because these transfers may result in actions that will constitute
significant intrusions into an individual's private life.64 1
CONCLUSION
Under the Working Party's suggested approach for assessing
the adequacy of a third country's data protection, the Member
States and the Commission should find that although U.S. ad
hoc, sectoral data protection does not ensure adequate protec-
tion across the board, U.S. regulation is adequate in many signif-
icant areas. Primarily, U.S. privacy laws in the public sector and
a few areas of the private sector such as telecommunications and
credit reporting provide adequate protection. Further, the
Member States will probably conclude that U.S. legislation gov-
637. See supra notes 446-58 and accompanying text (discussing lack of privacy legis-
lation regarding direct marketing).
638. See supra note 523-33 and accompanying text (relating Working Party's proce-
dure for assessing adequacy of data transfers to third countries where transfers are not
white listed).
639. See supra note 529 and accompanying text (explaining that Member States
should first analyze transfer posing most serious threats to privacy).
640. See supra notes 531, 533 and accompanying text (describing transfers involv-
ing sensitive data as transfers that deserve priority).
641. See supra notes 534-35 and accompanying text (noting that transfers that may
constitute intrusion into individual's private life deserve priority).
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erning banking and employment is not sufficient, but significant
self-regulation in these areas may constitute adequate protec-
tion. Member States will likely find that in some areas of the
private sector such as health care and direct marketing, both pri-
vacy laws and self-regulation are still not adequate. If so, Mem-
ber States will not white list transfers to the United States in
these areas.
